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Abstract
What are the macroeconomic implications of changes in sovereign risk premia? In this paper, I
use a novel identiﬁcation strategy coupled with a new dataset for the Euro Area to answer this ques-
tion. I show that exogenous innovations in sovereign risk premia were an important driver of the eco-
nomic dynamics of crisis-hit countries, explaining 30-50% of the forecast error of unemployment. I also
shed light on the mechanisms through which this occurs. Fluctuations in sovereign risk premia ex-
plain 20-40% of the variance of private borrowing costs. Increases in sovereign risk result in substan-
tial capital ﬂight, external adjustment and import compression. In contrast, governments appear not
to increase their primary balances in response to increases in sovereign risk. Identifying these causal
eﬀects involves isolating a source of ﬂuctuations in sovereign borrowing costs exogenous to the econ-
omy in question. I address this problem by relying upon the transmission of country-speciﬁc events
during the crisis in Europe to the sovereign risk premia in the remainder of the union. I construct a
new dataset of critical events in foreign crisis-hit countries and I measure the impact of these events
on yields in the economy of interest at an intraday frequency. An aggregation of foreign events serves
as a proxy variable for structural innovations to the yield to identify shocks in a proxy SVAR. I ex-
tend this methodology into a Bayesian setting to allow for ﬂexible panel assumptions. A counterfactual
analysis is used to remove the impact of foreign events from the bond yields of crisis hit countries: I
ﬁnd that 40-60% of the trough-to-peak moves in bond yields in crisis-hit countries are explained by for-
eign events, thereby suggesting that the crisis was not purely a function of weak local economic conditions.
Key words: High frequency identiﬁcation, Narrative identiﬁcation, Contagion, Bayesian VARs, Proxy
SVARs, Panel VARs.
Author's E-mail: sab202@cam.ac.uk.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E44, E65, F42
∗I am grateful to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank for awarding this paper with the 2014 Klaus Liebscher award. I would
like to thank James Cloyne, Giancarlo Corsetti, Marek Jarocinski, Alex Kohlhas, Michele Piﬀer, Morten Ravn, Steve Theile,
Riccardo Trezzi and Stephen Wright for helpful comments and advice. I also thank conference and seminar participants at the
Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Johns Hopkins SAIS, the University of Mannheim, the Cambridge
macroeconomics workshop, the EDGE Jamboree, the 7th Rimini Bayesian Econometrics Workshop and Goldman Sachs for
their attention and feedback. Further gratitude, as always, to Donald Robertson for his continued guidance. I would like to
acknowledge the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance for providing the funds to purchase the intraday data as well as
Giancarlo Corsetti for his support in the funding application. The brokerage ﬁrm ICAP is attributed with providing said data.
I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council and the Royal Economic Society for personal ﬁnancial support. All
errors are my own.
1
1 Introduction
What are the macroeconomic implications of high and variable sovereign risk premia? To what extent can
fear of default in the sovereign debt market drive an economic downturn and destabilize the economy? While
these questions have dominated recent policy debates, there is limited empirical evidence on the eﬀects that
ﬂuctuations in sovereign risk may exert on macroeconomic dynamics. The challenge is simultaneity. On
the one hand, a rise in premia may reﬂect fundamental economic weaknesses that foreshadow worsening
primary balances and a rise in public debt. On the other hand, high interest rates on public debt may in
turn exacerbate ﬁscal distortions and credit conditions, curbing output and thus undermining the budget.
The main contribution of this paper is to separate the latter from the former and address this endogeneity
problem.
There is a substantial literature describing the economic conditions and dynamics associated with sovereign
debt crises and sovereign default.1 However, the observation of a crisis does not determine its causality. Nor
is how one should deﬁne a crisis, beyond default, clear. This paper focuses on sovereign borrowing costs. I
utilise a novel combination of high frequency and narrative identiﬁcation strategies to isolate an exogenous
source of variation in sovereign risk premia. Speciﬁcally, I rely on two well-known observations about the
recent ﬁnancial crisis in Europe.2 First, the prices of Euro Area sovereign bonds reacted strongly to speciﬁc
events - be they policy announcements, speeches, riots, elections etc. Second, events that were speciﬁc to
individual countries transmitted to sovereign borrowing costs across the rest of the union. The maintained
assumption is that this transmission of foreign events reﬂects movements in sovereign bond yields that are
plausibly orthogonal to innovations to the local economy.
To isolate bond market movements due to foreign events, I ﬁrst build a new narrative dataset of the crisis
period. I use news summaries to isolate key, country-speciﬁc events in economies suﬀering from elevated
sovereign borrowing costs during the crisis period; specifcally, I consider events in Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Cyprus and Greece. I determine, using a news wire, the time at which an event occurred. I then
measure the impact on sovereign yields in other crisis-hit countries by looking at the response of the relevant
sovereign bond market in an immediate time window spanning an announcement.
Using this dataset, I show that, for countries that have experienced elevated sovereign risk premia, up
to 50% of the forecast error variance of the sovereign bond yield was unrelated to the local economy. The
macroeconomic consequences were sizeable. Innovations to sovereign risk were a critical driver of recent un-
employment dynamics; they explain close to 40% of the variation of the unemployment rate and a substantial
proportion of the observed increase in unemployment in crisis hit countries since 2010. In terms of relative
magnitudes: on average a 100bps increase in the sovereign yield corresponds to a 2 percentage point reduction
in industrial production growth and adds 0.9 percentage points to the unemployment rate (both are peak
responses).
This paper's key methodological feature is integrating high frequency bond market reactions into the
identiﬁcation stage of a dynamic, macroeconomic time series model. I use the monthly aggregation of high
frequency market reactions to foreign events as a proxy variable for a latent structural innovation to the yield.
This follows the proxy SVAR approach of Mertens and Ravn (2013a,b). The proxy SVAR is critical in this
1See, for example, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009), De Paoli et al. (2009), Borensztein and Panizza (2009), Levy Yeyati and
Panizza (2011), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) and Mendoza and Yue (2012).
2To highlight a few examples from this literature documenting these facts: Gade et al. (2013) show that statements by
European politicians (both nationally and at a EU level) have had meaningful impact on sovereign borrowing costs. Brutti and
Saure (2013) show that during the early stages of the crisis in Greece (2009-2011), critical events related to that country passed
through to CDS spreads in the remainder of the EU. Afonso et al. (2012), De Santis (2012) and Arezki et al. (2011) highlight
the importance and transmission of ratings decisions. Attinasi et al. (2009) and Acharya et al. (2011) conduct similar analysis
for bank bailout decisions. In the broadest case, Beetsma et al. (2013) show that news in general (as isolated from a news
summary) as opposed to speciﬁc events also move markets throughout the union.
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context as it is designed to deal with the mismeasurement that is endemic to my identiﬁcation strategy. Events
are observed irregularly, intraday data is noisy and market reactions may be prone to over/undershooting.
One cannot assume that the high frequency bond market reactions are a perfect measure of the informational
content of an event. For example, they may be attenuated due to pre-announcement rumours. To account
for these features of the data, I explicitly model the proxy as an aggregation of infrequently observed, poorly
measured signals over the true structural innovation.
I extend the methodology of Mertens and Ravn into a panel setting. The crisis provides only a short time
series of observations. In order to improve the precision of the estimates I use the information contained in the
cross-section of crisis countries. I focus my attention only on Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.3 However,
the crisis has struck countries in diﬀerent ways with varying intensity - a homogenous parameter setup is
an overly strong assumption. This motivates a Bayesian approach. I select priors that utilise cross-sectional
shrinkage to exploit the information from multiple countries without imposing cross-country homogeneity
(following Jarocinski (2010)).4 This methodology allows for an estimate of heterogeneous country-speciﬁc
models that make use of the information in the cross-section, as well as an average model around which the
heterogeneous parameters are centred. How close the parameters are to this cross-country average, i.e. the
degree of shrinkage, is allowed to be data dependent. The panel setup works in both stages of the estimation
procedure. Information from the cross-section is used to inform the parameters in the reduced form VAR as
well as aid the identiﬁcation of shocks.
The adaptation of the proxy SVAR into a Bayesian setup represents an additional methodological con-
tribution of this paper. I rewrite the model in a fashion that allows me to obtain the density of the proxy
conditional on the reduced form model. This results in a hierarchical, joint posterior density which is
straightforward to simulate numerically. This procedure uses all the information contained in the proxy and
macroeconomic time series data when constructing estimates of the model parameters. Credible intervals
reﬂect estimation uncertainty about both the reduced form and identiﬁcation stages of the model.
To set the scope of the analysis, I do not attempt to disentangle the sources of the transmission between
countries: the focus is purely on the macroeconomic implications. Potential channels have been described
elsewhere in the literature. To highlight a few: countries in a currency union are vulnerable to belief-driven
crises (De Grauwe (2011)); foreign events could transmit by coordinating investors onto bad equilibria.
Alternatively, negative events in one country could alter the parameters of policy in the rest of the union
either by committing limited bailout resources or altering political support for interventions.5 Transmission
could ﬂow through common creditors (Arellano and Bai (2013)). Last, the sustainability of the currency
union also came under question; alterations in market conﬁdence in the political commitment to the union
may result in a convertibility premium during times of stress.
These channels are not mutually exclusive, nor do I wish to pretend that the above is exhaustive. However,
a strength of the analysis is that it is robust to the channels listed above and does not require making
statements over their relative importance. Furthermore, these sources of transmission represent reasons why
one can observe a change in the riskiness of the sovereign separate from economic conditions. They are also
illustrative of the fragilities in the Euro Area that enable the identiﬁcation strategy of relying on external
events to isolate exogenous movements in yields. However, this implies that movements in yields are caused
by an intensiﬁcation of the crisis in Europe as a whole. This may have diﬀerent implications from a purely
3Cyprus and Greece are omitted from the main analysis due to a lack of intraday data. Cyprus' small size and the fact that
Greece experienced default suggest they may not be appropriate to include in the sample regardless. One can attempt to extend
the analysis to non-crisis countries (Germany, France etc.); however, a proxy constructed with foreign events has only a weak
relationship with yields in those countries and the analysis fails to produce meaningful results.
4Discussion of how the reduced form panel model ﬁts into the wider class of panel VARs can be found in Canova and Ciccarelli
(2013) which oﬀers a review of the relevant literature.
5Corsetti et al. (2006) show how the resources available to an international lender of last resort alters equilibria in a self-
fulﬁlling crisis. Tirole (2012) oﬀers a discussion of cross country insurance mechanisms in the context of the crisis.
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domestic-driven crisis.
As a consequence, I use the terminology employed in Ang and Longstaﬀ (2013) and refer to identiﬁed
shocks as systemic sovereign risk shocks. Ang and Longstaﬀ (2013) deﬁne this concept from an asset pric-
ing framework as the country-speciﬁc vulnerability of sovereigns to common adverse events, as opposed to
idiosyncratic risk related to sovereign speciﬁc factors. The idea being that a sovereign could default due to a
purely local issue such as an isolated political crisis; alternatively, sovereign risk could be due to a shock that
triggers a chain of defaults, which in this context, would reﬂect the Euro Area's fragility as a system. The
external nature of the identiﬁcation implies that I am identifying an increase in sovereign risk which aﬀects
several countries simultaneously and thus the identiﬁed shock refers to this systemic component of the risk
premia.6
The critical identifying assumption underpinning the proxy is that local bond yield movements due to
foreign events are independent of the economic situation of the local country. One may have several concerns
over whether this is true. First, events in speciﬁc countries could be a reaction to prior macroeconomic
shocks in other countries or to common shocks. My identiﬁcation strategy is strengthened by its reliance
upon intraday ﬁnancial market reactions to events. Market participants are able to anticipate systematic
reactions between events abroad and economic conditions at home. Therefore, the market reaction is the
unanticipated component of an announcement, orthogonal to shocks that the market is already aware of (see
Gürkaynak and Wright (2013)).
Second, the observed high frequency market move could be a function of multiple shocks to the local
economy that are occurring simultaneously. Care is taken to only consider events where no other market-
relevant news happened in the same time window. I exclude data releases from the analysis as they may be
capturing innovations in a common business cycle component. Pan-European interventions are also omitted
as they contain a role for the ECB and would be correlated with monetary shocks. A further concern
may be that the reaction to the foreign event occurs because market participants are learning about local
economic conditions. However, once one excludes events that may be informative about common shocks
(data releases, ECB announcements etc.), there is little reason to think that foreign agents have additional
private information about the local economy.7
Third, the market reaction could also be explained by real or ﬁnancial inter-linkages between the event
country and the local economy. This cannot be ruled out and may weaken the identifying assumptions.
However, the main results can largely be replicated using the narrower set of events related only to Greece,
a country representing a minimal share of Euro Area GDP, imports and external liabilities.
In a preliminary analysis, I provide evidence to support the identifying assumptions. By running predictive
regressions at alternative time frequencies I show that there is no evidence that the market reactions of a
country's bond yield to foreign events can be explained either by past market reactions to events, be they
local or foreign, or by past macroeconomic data.8 Aggregations of the market reaction to foreign events are
6The term systemic risk is loosely deﬁned. It is both used to represent exposure common or propagated shocks; as well as
vulnerabilities in the system unrelated to economic fundamentals such as a sudden liquidity crises or shifts in investors beliefs.
For the crisis in Europe both interpretations ﬁt, there is a sense that a portion of the crisis was self-fulﬁlling while at the same
time the institutions governing the Euro were a shared fundamental. The term also ﬁts well in this context given the external
nature of the identiﬁcation. Certain countries were clearly systemically important during the crisis; Greece, in particular, came
perilously close to leaving the currency union and rendering the Euro no longer irreversible. Even the tiny country of Cyprus
potentially took on systemic importance when losses were threatened on insured depositors.
7One may argue that foreign policymakers may reveal additional information over the state of policy on a pan-European
level. For example, the extent of political support for interventions from international policymakers. However, this is exactly
the sort of innovation to the yield we wish to identify.
8The fact that the narrative used here is based upon market reactions means one should be less concerned about anticipation
aﬀects. Any prior information should be priced. We should of think of the proxy series used here as capturing an unanticipated
shock. Furthermore, it is a shock to a forward looking variable in the shape of the bond yield, which could capture private
sector expectations about future economic conditions. This means the concerns about foresight in VAR identiﬁcation as raised
by, for example, Leeper et al. (2013) are less relevant. This is not to say that the true state of the world has an invertible VAR
representation during the crisis. However, as Sims (2012) discusses SVARs, can still perform well even when with working data
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also contemporaneously uncorrelated with market reactions to data releases, local events, or ECB decisions
(capturing monetary shocks). This supports the assumption that the moves in local bond yields due to
foreign events are not caused by a simultaneous change in local economic conditions.
Beyond the results described above, I also shed light on the channels by which increases in the sovereign
borrowing costs feed through into the real economy. There is no direct evidence that the increase in yields
provokes governments to improve their primary ﬁscal balance and reduce their rate of borrowing. Indeed, in
some countries, the ﬁscal balance deteriorates on impact in response to a systemic shock. This may reﬂect
weakening economic conditions and it is worth noting that response of the ﬁscal balance is at zero at the
same point that the unemployment rate peaks. Therefore, if one deﬁnes ﬁscal tightening as a change in the
cyclically-adjusted balance, then the relative co-movement of the ﬁscal balance and the unemployment rate
is still evidence of subsequent contractionary ﬁscal policy.
The theoretical literature that embeds sovereign risk into a general equilibrium model of the macroe-
conomy highlights two further mechanisms. Corsetti et al. (2013) argue that a channel via which increases
in the sovereign borrowing costs feed through into real economy is by causing a deterioration in private
sector ﬁnancial conditions, thereby acting as a negative ﬁnancial shock. This eﬀect is readily apparent in
the results of this paper: a 100bp increase in the sovereign bond yield leads to a more than one to one
increase in corporate yields, an increase in private loan rates and a fall in equity prices. I show that 20-40%
of the forecast error variance in a composite measure of private borrowing costs was due to ﬂuctuations in
sovereign risk. Mendoza and Yue (2012) highlight the external implications of sovereign debt crises, arguing
that capital ﬂight leads to a loss of access to imported inputs that cannot be substituted for domestically,
thereby harming productivity. My results also support this mechanism. I ﬁnd that systemic shocks lead to
capital ﬂight; a 100bps increase in the bond yield is consistent with private capital outﬂows worth 3.7% of
GDP. This leads to an external adjustment which results in an improvement in the trade balance of about
0.6% of GDP, which appears to result from import compression.
A second result of interest pertains to a counterfactual analysis: what would the sovereign bond yields have
been if the identiﬁed systemic shocks had not occurred and borrowing costs were solely determined by local
conditions? There has been some debate in the literature about the extent to which sovereign borrowing costs
amongst Euro Area countries are explained by local macroeconomic variables. For example, De Grauwe and
Ji (2013) and Aizenman et al. (2013) argue that movements in yield could not be explained by macroeconomic
determinants of sovereign risk during the crisis period. While using an estimated DSGE embodying sovereign
default risk, Bi and Traum (2013) suggest borrowing costs in Greece were consistent with macroeconomic
fundamentals. The counterfactual analysis lies somewhere in between these two extremes. I ﬁnd that 40-60%
of the trough to peak move in borrowing costs in crisis-hit countries was as a result of systemic shocks. This
eﬀect peaked in July 2011: the model estimates that systemic shocks added 127bp to the 10 year Italian
bonds with an equivalent ﬁgure of 381bp for Portugal. The systemic component spiked again in May 2012,
around the time of the Greek election,the interpretation being that at the worst point of the crisis the Italian
government was paying 1.3% in additional interest to borrow for 10 years compounded as a result of factors
unrelated to local economic conditions. However, from a policy perspective, the ECB interventions in the
Summer/Autumn of 2012 appear to have been eﬀective: by the end of the year, the impact of systemic shocks
had abated and yields appear to be at a neutral setting in line with local macroeconomic conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; following a brief review of the relevant literature,
section 2 lays out the concept behind the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 3 gives context to this identiﬁcation
strategy by detailing speciﬁc occasions on which foreign country-speciﬁc events move local yields in other crisis
hit countries, and also delineates the data collection procedure. Section 4 describes the Bayesian estimation
generated from non-invertible models; especially when augmented with forward looking market prices.
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procedure. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis, section 6 discusses robustness and section 7 provides
the conclusion.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to the strand of literature which documents the impact of debt crises and default.9
There is evidence that crises are associated with periods of economic weakness but opinion regarding the
extent and dynamic impact still lacks broad consensus. Analysing data for default events, De Paoli et al.
(2009) suggest debt crises correspond to output losses of around 5% of GDP lasting as long as 10 years. In
an annual panel growth model Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) show that crisis episodes correspond to output
losses of around 10% after 8 years. In contrast, Borensztein and Panizza (2009) ﬁnd output losses of 0.5-2.0%
that do not last more than a year and Tomz and Wright (2007) ﬁnd only a weak relationship between output
and defaults. By studying the evolution of output on a quarterly basis Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011) ﬁnd
that the default quarter is typically the trough in activity and recovery follows immediately afterwards. This
suggests that the decline in activity appears to be due to the anticipation of, rather than being a product of,
default. An acknowledged weakness in this literature is that debt crises are endogenous.10 Another issue is
that these analyses rely upon actually observing default. Taking the Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011) results
at face value suggests that it is the increase in the sovereign risk premia that does damage to the economy.
Countries that experience elevated borrowing costs but honour their obligations are not considered.11
A paper more close to the analysis conducted here, and which also focuses on the crisis in Europe, is
Neri and Ropele (2013). They use a factor model to isolate a common sovereign risk component during
the crisis and use it as an endogenous variable in a FAVAR. The distinction with this work is that their
identiﬁcation strategy relies upon a Cholesky ordering, with the sovereign risk factor ordered after monetary
policy but ahead of macroeconomic variables. This represents a strong identifying assumption as it requires
that monetary policy did not respond to sovereign risk tensions contemporaneously and also that sovereign
risk premia are not a contemporaneous reaction to macroeconomic or ﬁnancial shocks. Uribe and Yue (2006)
investigate the relationship between business cycles and borrowing costs in emerging markets; they also rely
on a Cholesky ordering such that real variables do not respond contemporanously to innovations in country
risk premia (i.e. the opposite of Neri and Ropele (2013)); although they add theoretical evidence to back their
assumptions. Oliver de Groot and Leiner-Killinger (2013) attempt to identify innovation to the sovereign's
cost of borrowing in a panel of European countries as the movement in yields that are orthogonal to four
common macroeconomic and ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed ﬁrst using sign restrictions. This requires the assumption
that the innovation to the yield is the least important driver of ﬂuctuations in the economy.
From a methodological standpoint, this paper is closely related to that strand of the empirical macroeco-
nomic literature which uses narrative methods to identify macroeconomic shocks; that is to say, by carefully
reading policy documents or by an analysis of historical events one can identify innovations in economic series
that are used as exogenous regressors separate from the estimated disturbances in a time series model. This
literature follows the seminal contribution of Romer and Romer (1989).12 The approach taken by Mertens
9Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) oﬀer a historical review of the aftermaths of ﬁnancial crises in general.
10There have been attempts to improve identiﬁcation: Borensztein and Panizza (2009) use a two step procedure where they
estimate the probability of default separately based on a selection of contemporaneous determinants and include it as a regressor
in the growth equation. Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) try to obtain identiﬁcation by restricting attention to debt crises which
occur during periods of good economic performance. However, neither of these approaches provide a true source of exogenous
variation in sovereign risk.
11Pescatori and Sy (2007) make this point and ﬁnd the deﬁning debt crises by high borrowing costs rather than default alters
empirical ﬁndings.
12Some notable examples include Romer and Romer (2004) for monetary policy shocks, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey
(2011b) for government spending shocks and Burnside et al. (2004), Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2013) and Favero and
Giavazzi (2012) for tax shocks.
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and Ravn (2013a,b) and Stock and Watson (2012), and which is also used here, is distinct in the sense that
the outside information contained in the narrative is not treated as a separate variable in the model but is
instead used as a proxy or external instrument for the structural shock of interest.13
A second strand of methodological literature relates to high frequency identiﬁcation. High frequency
market reactions to events are a rich source of exogenous variation, because common information about other
macroeconomic shocks should already be embedded in market prices around the time of an announcement.
High frequency market reactions to federal reserve decisions have been used to identify the impact of monetary
policy shocks; for example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) use the daily change in bond prices on FOMC
meeting days as their preferred measure. The more recent works of Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) and
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) drill down to an intraday frequency and assess market reactions to FOMC
announcements in much tighter windows in order to identify monetary shocks. Faust et al. (2004) discuss how
one can identify VARs using high frequency reactions in the futures market.Gürkaynak and Wright (2013)
oﬀer a detailed review of this literature.
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to look at intra-day market reactions with respect to the Euro-
crisis, and to furthermore use those reactions in the narrative identiﬁcation framework described. However,
there is a substantial literature looking at the determinants of yields during the crisis. As described, Ang
and Longstaﬀ (2013) use an asset pricing model to seperate Eurozone country borrowing costs into those
due to local idiosyncratic factors and those due to a vulnerability to common shocks, which they denote the
systemic component. Aizenman et al. (2013), De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Giordano et al. (2013) and Manasse
and Zavalloni (2013) all investigate how sovereign borrowing costs depend on macroeconomic conditions,
either across countries or over time.
2 Proxy SVAR Identiﬁcation
To ﬁx ideas, I begin by brieﬂy describing the identiﬁcation methodology. I rely upon the proxy SVAR approach
of Mertens and Ravn (2013a,b) and Stock and Watson (2012) whereby identiﬁcation of the contemporaneous
relationships between macroeconomic variables is obtained via an external proxy that is assumed to be
correlated only with the structural shock of interest. Consider the following dynamic macroeconomic model:
α(L)Yt = Bt
Where Yt is a N × 1 vector of observed macroeconomic variables (including sovereign borrowing costs)
and t is a set of unidentiﬁed structural shocks satisfying: E(t) = 0, E(t
′
t) = IN and E(t
′
s) = 0∀s 6= t .
Following the standard SVAR assumptions, the reduced form residuals from a regression of Yt on its lags are
a linear combination of the structural shocks: ut = Bt; where ut are the reduced form residuals and B is a
non-singular N ×N matrix. The identiﬁcation problem emerges because there is not enough infomation in
the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals, E(utu
′
t) = Σu, to identify B. Solutions to this problem
in the literature often impose restrictions on the matrix B (long or short) or propose restrictions a priori on
the impact certain shocks have on the included variables. In this context, short-run restrictions are not viable
as we are interested in the response of variables derived from market prices which react almost instaneously
to new information. Long-run or sign restrictions are potentially also questionable.
The solution taken here is not to make any assumptions about the contemporaneous relationships between
macroeconomic series, but instead use an external variable to estimate those relationships. The vector of
structural shocks can be partitioned into a shock of interest and other structural shocks t = (εt, ε˜
′
t)
′. In this
13I favour the use of the word proxy to describe the narrative time series used here as, unlike Stock and Watson (2012), the
identiﬁcation stage of the model in this paper is not an instrumental variable based regression.
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case the scalar structural shock of interest, εt, is the systemic sovereign risk shock - i.e. the structural shock
to the sovereign's cost of borrowing unrelated to local economic conditions. I abuse terminology somewhat
and describe the remaining structural shocks, ε˜t, as other local economic shocks but the vector also contains
shocks stemming from external sources - such as monetary shocks from the ECB.
I assume there exists a proxy variablemt that is correlated with the structural shock of interest, E(mtεt) =
φ, and uncorrelated with the other structural shocks, E(mtε˜t) = 0, where φ is a scalar. These are the critical
identifying assumptions and are analogous to the exogeneity and relevance conditions for a valid instrument.
Following Mertens and Ravn (2013a,b), the proxy could be considered a scaled version of the true shock
measured with some error, for example mt = φεt + ωt, where ωt is measurement error uncorrelated with the
shock (ωt ∼ IID(0, σ2ω) ) and φ is a scalar coeﬃcient.
From the non-singularity of B, there exists A−1 = B with the corresponding relationship Aut = t;
where A is an N × N identiﬁcation matrix scaled such that the structural shocks have unit variance. The
identiﬁcation matrix can be partitioned such that A = [a′1, a
′
2]
′
with εt = a1ut. Given ut, the vector a1 is
suﬃcient to identify the structural shock εt.
14 In contrast to Mertens and Ravn (2013b), the variation in the
approach here is that I use this relationship to estimate the ﬁrst row of the A matrix, a1, as opposed to the
ﬁrst column of the B matrix; speciﬁcally:
mt = φa1ut + ωt (1)
The unit variance restriction on the structural shock implies the quadratic form a1Σua
′
1 = 1, which provides
the additional restriction to identify φ.15 Working with the A rather than the B matrix (i.e. an A-type
model in the SVAR parlance of Amisano and Giannini (1997)) is of technical importance as it means one
has single equation regression between the proxy and the reduced form residuals about which one can make
panel assumptions. Furthermore, once one has speciﬁed the distribution of ωt, the conditional density of the
proxy p(mt|ut;φa1) is known. This property is useful for embedding the identiﬁcation strategy in a Bayesian
framework. I return to the issue of implementing this identiﬁcation strategy in a Bayesian VAR, including
the distributional assumptions over ωt in section 4. However, the challenge is constructing a proxy, mt, which
satisﬁes the identifying assumptions; i.e. a proxy which is correlated with changes in sovereign risk premia
but not other local macroeconomic shocks. This is dealt with in the next section.
3 The proxy variable
3.1 Evidence from speciﬁc events
3.1.1 Catalonia Requests a Bailout, 28th of August 2012
At 13:01 London time on the 28th of August 2012 the Reuters news agency reported that the Spanish region
of Catalonia, the wealthiest in the country with an economy the same size as Portugal, would request 5
billion euros of aid from Spain's Regional Liquidity Fund. The report was conﬁrmed oﬃcially by a Catalan
government spokesman 5 minutes later. The move had been signalled by the Catalan authorities but the
announcement still provoked a reaction in ﬁnancial markets. At 13:00 London time Spanish 10 benchmark
14The matrix B can also be partitioned such that that B = [b1, b2] and ut = b1εt + b2ε˜t. In order to construct impulse
responses and variance decompositions, an estimate of b1 is needed. With an estimate of the covariance matrix one can easily
switch between the vectors a1 and b1. Using the relationship ΣuA′ = B, it follows that b1 = Σua′1. Note, a1 and b1 are
respectively 1×N and N × 1 vectors.
15While assuming unit variances is standard practice in this setup it is not completely innocuous. First, it means that a1 is
only identiﬁed up to a signing and scaling convention. A one standard deviation stock has no interpretation so one needs to
make a scaling assumption when computing impulse responses; variance decompositions and counter facturals are unaﬀected
however. Second, it is impossible to make any statement about the relative variances of shocks across countries.
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Figure 1: Catalonia Requests a Bailout, 28th August 2012: High Frequency Market Reaction
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Notes: Intraday bond market moves in Spain and Italy around Catalonia's decision to request a bailout from the Spanish regional
liquidity mechanism (28th of August 2012). The series are tick data aggregated into 1 minute averages (90% trimmed) for the mid-yield
to maturity on 10 year benchmark bond. Italian yield is the red solid line and refers to the left hand y-axis. Spanish yield is the blue
dashed line and refers to the right hand y-axis. The x-axis refers to London time.
year bonds yielded 6.36%; by 14:00 the yield was 6.43%, a 3 standard deviation move at an hourly frequency
over the crisis period.16
The bailout decision was largely a domestic policy matter. In eﬀect, it represented a transfer of liabilities
from the regions to the central government in Spain and a mutualisation of the Spanish public balance
sheet. It had no direct international aspect. Nonetheless, the move in yields was not conﬁned only to Spain.
Italian 10-year bond yields increased by 5 basis points immediately subsequent to the announcement and
yields in core countries declined. For example, German yields fell by 1.5bp in the few minutes following
the announcement.17 To give a sense of the market move around the announcement ﬁgure 1 presents the
intraday bond yields in Spain and Italy on the 28th of August 2012.
3.1.2 The Greek Parliament Approves Austerity, 12th of February 2012
By early 2012 it was clear to both policymakers and market participants alike that Greece would need a
second bailout. An agreement in principle was reached between Greece and the Troika of oﬃcial creditors.
In exchange for oﬃcial sector ﬁnancing, Greece was required to embark on additional austerity measures,
including 150,000 public sector job losses and 3.3 billion euros of spending cuts. The package was approved by
the Greek Cabinet on the 10th of February 2012 but this led to the resignation of 6 Cabinet members. Late
in the evening on Sunday the 12th the package would be voted on in the Greek parliament. The leadership of
16See http://www.eurointelligence.com/brieﬁngs/2012-08-29 for a general description of events surrounding the bailout. A
live summary of events during the day can be found here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/debt-crisis-live/9502734/Debt-
crisis-as-it-happened-August-28-2012.html
17 Curiously, there was little response to the announcement in Irish and Portuguese bond markets. But by this stage in the
crisis these two countries had been bailed out by the Troika and market attention was elsewhere. Furthermore, Ireland was on
its way to recovery at this point and had recently started reissuing long term debt.
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the two main Greek political parties backed the agreement. However, political support was not unanimous.
A small nationalist party, Laos, withdrew its support from the governing coalition and the days leading up
to the vote were marked by social unrest. Reports from the time suggest the package was deeply unpopular
with the electorate.18
A no vote could have resulted in disorderly default. Greece had a 14.5 billion euro bond payment scheduled
on March 20th; a payment that, in the absence of a bailout, it appeared that the country would be unable to
meet. Oﬃcial creditors refused to sanction a bailout unless austerity measures were approved. Furthermore,
Greece's prime minister, Lucas Papademos, warned that a failure to pass the bill may result in the country's
exit from the currency union.
Ultimately the legislation passed comfortably, by 199 votes in favour to 74 against, out of 300 lawmakers.
The news was not all positive: Athens suﬀered from rioting with several buildings burned; 40 government
MPs also rebelled against the measure leading to their being ousted from their parties and cutting the ruling
coalition's majority. Nonetheless, ﬁnancial markets reacted positively to the vote. Sovereign bond yields fell
sharply in Greece when the market opened on the 13th and the response spread throughout the union. By
8:30am London time yields on benchmark 10 year sovereign bonds had fallen by 19.9bp in Portugal, 10.0bp
in Italy and 4.0bp in Spain when compared to the close on the 10th (there was, however, little reaction in
Ireland).
3.2 Discussion of the identiﬁcation strategy
For clarity, the remainder of this paper adheres to the following terminology. The event country refers to
the country where an event takes place. The local country refers to the country for which the bond market
reaction is being recorded; the local country is the country of interest from the perspective of the analysis
and usually not the event country. Tautologically, a foreign country is one external to the local country; so
a foreign event is something that happens abroad from the perspective of the local country. In the Catalan
example, Spain is the event country. If Italy was the country of interest, Catalonia's bailout is a foreign event
which provoked a local bond market reaction of 5bp. If Spain was the country of interest, then the Catalonia
decision is a local event; the event and local country are the same.
These two examples illustrate the transmission of foreign events to the borrowing costs of other Euro Area
nations. More importantly, one can claim that there is little direct causality between the local bond market
moves and other preceding local economic shocks. For example, it is diﬃcult to think that the move in the
Italian yield, in response to Catalonia's decision, as being a caused by a change in fundamental macroeconomic
conditions in Italy in August 2012. It was not a reaction to a weakening in Italian total factor productivity,
or a change in the Italian government's ﬁscal stance. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Catalans were thinking
about Italy at all when they made their announcement. Similarly, the Greek MPs that voted for austerity
should be concerned only with economic conditions in Greece and not those in Portugal, regardless of the
impact their decision had on Portugal's borrowing costs. However, even if there was endogenous feedback
between policy choices in one country from macroeconomic conditions in others, and such reactions may
be reasonable in light of how the crisis developed, any systematic reaction should be anticipated by market
participants, and should be priced. This also applies to common macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, in the
Catalan example, we can think of the move in the Italian yield observed above as not being caused by changes
in Italian economic conditions; rather, it may cause changes in those conditions, but was not caused by them.
This identiﬁcation strategy breaks down if agents in the event country are reacting to changes in macroe-
18For an account of events and political mood surrounding the Greek vote I refer readers to Hewitt (2013) pages 238-246. For
more journalistic accounts written in immediate aftermath of the vote see: http://www.eurointelligence.com/brieﬁngs/2012-02-
13/ & http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/ﬁnancialcrisis/9078221/Greece-passes-crucial-bailout-vote-as-country-burns.html.
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conomic conditions in the local country that the market is not yet aware of, such that the foreign event is
informative about local economic shocks. Therefore, the critical identifying assumption is not that foreign
events are not a reaction to local macroeconomic shocks but rather that markets are rational and there is no
information asymmetry between market participants and foreign agents regarding these shocks at the point
of an event.
The information asymmetry problem demonstrates why a focus on foreign events is necessary. If, for
example, we considered how local bond yields respond to a local announcement of an austerity package, then
any market reaction would also be a response to the ﬁscal shock that the austerity package captures. Thus,
local policymakers can reveal information about other local economic shocks when they make their policy
announcements. For the same reason, events at a pan-European level cannot be considered. Pan-European
policy interventions normally have some involvement from the ECB, which implies that they have monetary
component; market reactions would be correlated with monetary shocks. Similarly, the market reaction to
data releases cannot be used as they may be informative about common macroeconomic shocks.19
Once one rules out a direct causal relationship between the market reaction to foreign events and lo-
cal/common economic shocks, the question remains: why does the market react? It could simply reﬂect the
real or ﬁnancial interlinkages between countries. However, these channels should be assessed in light of the
following. First, the main results in this paper can be obtained solely by focusing on events in Greece; a small
economy from a European perspective. For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2012, Italy's banking system's
exposure to Greek assets (private and public) was less than a tenth of a percent of GDP.20 Yet Greece's vote
in February 2012 caused a substantial decline in the Italian bond yield. To give context to the unusual size
of the reaction: on the 15th of February 2012 (3 days after the Greek vote) the Italian statistical agency
reported that Italy's GDP growth in Q4 2011 was 0.1% less than market participants expected,21 more than
the direct exposure to Greece, and yet the market's reaction to the data release was only to increase Italian
borrowing costs by 1.1bp. Second, the relative response to events seems weakly related to cross-country ex-
posures: Spain and Italy were much less exposed to Greece than was Germany in February 2012, yet German
yields rose in response to the Greek vote.22 Third the market reacted to events in Cyprus, a country an
order of magnitude smaller than Greece. Fourth, the sharp reduction of the ﬁnancial interlinkages between
countries over the crisis period has not been met by a reduction in degree of reaction to foreign events.23
Real and ﬁnancial interlinkages cannot be ruled out completely; however, there are other channels that can
explain the extent of the reaction. Foreign events could trigger shifts in market sentiment or a reassessment
of pre-existing information. This ties in with the idea that the crisis is self-fulﬁlling: foreign events act as the
catalyst which shifts investors' expectations between equilibria.24 Similarly, foreign events can inﬂuence local
19To see this, consider a speciﬁc example: the Italian bond market reaction to a Spanish industrial production release. Spanish
industrial production is usually released before its Italian equivalent. Yet the two series are closely correlated, which likely reﬂects
common shocks to their economies. This means that the Spanish data release is informative about Italian economic conditions
due to the fact it contains information about those common shocks. In eﬀect, the Spanish statistical oﬃce has private information
about Italy which it reveals with the data release.
20This ﬁgure is available from the BIS locational banking statistics. Direct trade ﬂows are also of a similar scale.
21Taken as the consensus forecast from the Bloomberg economic calendar.
22One can conduct an analysis of this nature more formally and regress the relative reaction to identiﬁed events on trade
or ﬁnancial interlinkages. The message from an analysis such as this is that trade interlinkages do not matter: the coeﬃcient
is insigniﬁcant and of the wrong sign. However, the market's reaction is weakly related to the size of ﬁnancial interlinkages.
Increasing the exposure of the domestic banking system to an event country by 1% of GDP increases the relative market reaction
by 0.08bp. However, a 1% of GDP increase in exposure is substantial. For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2012, when the Greek
vote took place, the range between the most exposed country (Germany) and the least exposed (Finland) was 0.7% of GDP. If
one restricts attention to just the four crisis countries in the sample the message is almost identical. The results of this analysis
can be obtained by contacting the author.
23To be speciﬁc, of the four crisis hit countries considered in the main analysis of the paper: the average total ﬁnancial
exposure of each individual countries to all the others has fallen from 13.9% of GDP in Q1 2010 to 3.1% of GDP in Q1 2013;
yields still react to events.
24The view that the crisis was in part self-fulﬁlling was one shared by ECB oﬃcials during the crisis. Mario Draghi speciﬁcally
laid out these concerns when explaining the motivation for outright monetary transactions on September 6th 2012. The
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borrowing costs through the impact which they have on the ability or willingness of unionwide authorities to
intervene, either by eroding political support for interventions amongst taxpayers in creditor countries or by
exhausting resources that have been precommited for interventions. The overidding concern during the crisis
was the sustainability of the currency union as a whole. As the future of the monetary union became less
certain, the cost of borrowing in any country would contain convertibility premia. Negative foreign events
can shift the probability of the state of the world as being one in which the Euro is irreversible to one in
which it is not.
I do not attempt to disentangle these channels. However, the above mechanisms are all means by which
the sovereign risk premia are aﬀected by factors external to the state of the local economy. This is the focus
of this paper: I take an observed set of changes in the bond yield about which it is plausible to argue that the
cause of the move was not an innovation to local economic conditions and therefore justiﬁes an exogeneity
assumption.
A ﬁnal issue with this identiﬁcation strategy is the nature of the systemic shocks. The innovations capture
a change in bond yields caused by an intensiﬁcation of the crisis as a whole. The shock is not country-speciﬁc.
This means that there are additional channels through which systemic shocks may inﬂuence the economy.
First, there is an additional uncertainty channel. Concerns over resolution of the institutional set up of the
currency union will inﬂuence the economy above and beyond the uncertainty over the local government's
ability to pay its debt. Second, even if direct interlinkages are not the primary reason for the transmission
of events, the shocks hit neighbouring countries in the union as well (albeit asymmetrically); thus there may
be additional eﬀects via external demand or via a deterioration in pan-European market conditions. This is
important to bear in mind when interpreting the results.
3.3 The proxy data
A key contribution of this paper is constructing a narrative of the crisis period in order to identify a set
of events similar to those descibed above. Given these events I then time when they occur and measure
the relavant bond market reaction to them. The proxy for the month for a local country is the sum of the
local bond market reactions to foreign events. This is the version of the proxy, denoted mt, that is used to
identify the monthly structural shocks from the reduced form VAR. The proxy is constructed from July 2009
to March 2013.
The data appendix (appendix B.1) describes the methodology used in constructing the dataset and its
summary statistics in detail. However, given the importance of the proxy to the main analysis, I highlight
a few key features of the data here. In terms of the sources to isolate events, the approach taken here is to
rely on news summaries.25 I use the ﬁnancial news sources Bloomberg and EuroIntelligence both of which
compile a daily news brieﬁng for European economic news. The former is released in the afternoon and
the latter in the morning. Both contain around 10-12 discrete news stories that are presented as digestible,
paragraph-long summaries. The selection of stories by EuroIntelligence appears to be at the judgment of
their editorial staﬀ and include a headline story which the staﬀ consider the main the event for the day.
The Bloomberg summary represents the most read (presumably by market participants as they are the main
users) European news stories during the day.
literature has emphasised that sovereign debt is vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crisis either due to a lack of commitment on the
part of policymakers (Calvo (1988)) or a sudden loss of liquidity (Cole and Kehoe (2000)). This feature of sovereign debt has
motivated recent theoretical literature on the the Euro-crises, with the observations concerned with how self-fulﬁlling crises
play out in a monetary union (see for example, Aguiar M and Gopinath (2012); Cooper (2012); Corsetti and Dedola (2013);
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013)).
25This is the approach taken in Beetsma et al. (2013). An alternative methodology is to use ready made crisis time lines such
as those compiled by the ECB or by private media outlets (as in Brutti and Saure (2013)) . However, the former only contains
events that involve the the ECB, the EU or the G20 in some capacity. The latter have richer coverage but cover inconsistent
periods and have no clear criteria for event selection.
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To be classiﬁed as an event, a news story must satisfy certain criteria. These are discussed in more detail
in the appendix. However, the most important are: (1) the story must relate to a single crisis-hit country;
speciﬁcally, either Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland, Italy or Spain; (2) the event must be timeable in the
sense that it is possible to isolate when it occurs so as to determine the market's reaction. There also limits
on the type of news considered, generally events are correspond to policy or political announcements. News
revolving around private companies or (importantly) data releases do not enter the proxy.
Events are timed to the minute when the ﬁrst headline related to the story appears on the Bloomberg
newswire. An untimeable event is one where it is impossible to identify an initial headline in an objective
fashion. For events that can be timed, the market reaction is considered over a 20 minute window on either
side of the initial headline. The market reaction is deﬁned as the change in the mid-yield to maturity on the
benchmark 10 year sovereign bond. The raw intra-day bond data is sourced at tick frequency from ICAP, a
brokerage ﬁrm which gathers the data while intermediating wholesale trading between ﬁnancial institutions.
A critical point is dealing with events that occur when markets are closed. European policymakers'
penchant for late night meetings means that omitting these events altogether risks throwing out critical
information. On the other hand, the long time window between close and open means that there is more
chance of another piece of important information being released and distorting the market's reaction. As a
compromise, and in the benchmark speciﬁcation, events that occur outside trading hours are included if they
are the headline story in the following morning news brieﬁng. This implies they should be viewed as the
most important European event that occurred overnight and thus, hopefully, represent what the market is
reacting to at the open. A sensitivity analysis excluding all events outside the period where the market is
open presented in section 6.
It is worth noting that some of the events may have little informational content or may be entirely
anticipated by the time of the announcement. However, beyond the use of headline stories for overnight
events, there is no need for any additional indicator of event importance, predictability, or whether the news
is positive or negative. This information is contained within the market's reaction.
Another concern is simultaneous events. Given the high frequency of the dataset, another story breaking
simultaneously is a relatively low probability outcome in a trading day. Nonetheless, the following steps are
taken to ensure markets are actually reacting to the event in question rather than other contemporaneous
news. The structure of the dataset means it is straightforward to single out any foreign event that overlaps
with a local event and these are not included in the proxy. Furthermore, if any local event occurs in a
period when markets are closed, no foreign event that occurred in the same closed period would be included
regardless if either event was a headline story in the following morning news brieﬁng. The time of local,
pan-European and certain international data releases are obtained from the Bloomberg economic calendar
and events that would overlap with a windows around these releases are similarly omitted.26 Events that
overlap with ECB decisions and press-conferences are not included. Lastly, any country-speciﬁc event that
overlaps with the announcement of a pan-European policy intervention is omitted. Such events are isolated
using the ECB's time line of the crisis27 and are timed in an identical fashion to the country-speciﬁc events
as described above.
Despite these steps it is impossible to be completely certain as to what drives the market move at any
point in time. There may be news from outside the Euro Area driving yields, as well as private information or
rumours that cannot be picked up using the approach taken here. Furthermore, yields are driven by technical
factors such as large transactions and variations in liquidity. That said, once one strips out coordinated
policy actions and data releases, there is little reason to think that any movement unrelated to the event is
systematically correlated with other macroeconomic information. Therefore, unexplained market moves are
26I refer readers to the online appendix for the complete list of omitted data events.
27See http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html
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Figure 2: Proxy variable and actual changes in the bond yield: Italy
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Notes: Comparison between the actual behaviour of Italian bond yields and the proxy variable. Y-axis denotes percentage moves in
the month. Green dashed line is the proxy variable calculated as the summed value of changes Italian yields during a window around
included foreign events in that month (right hand axis), blue undashed line is the the actual change in the average daily 10-year bond
yield over in the month (left hand axis). The graph is annotated with an illustrative set of important events.
unlikely to introduce endogeneity but they will introduce measurement error which motivates the speciﬁcation
described in section 4.
To give a measure of conﬁdence in this procedure, the results presented are robust to diﬀerent assumptions
over the construction of the proxy, particularly over the interval window considered for market reaction and
the types of events included - see section 6.
Completing the process described above leads to an amalgamation of policy announcements and political
events relevant to the six countries over the course of the crisis period. The depth of coverage of events is
encouraging. All the country-speciﬁc events included in the ECB's time line of the crisis are captured. The
same applies for Brutti and Saure (2013)'s narrative analysis of the crisis in Greece using a combination of
crisis time lines compiled by private media outlets. However, the depth of coverage and variety of events also
means that it is diﬃcult to describe completely the narrative in a concise manner within the main text of
this paper. Therefore, readers are referred to the appendix of this document for greater detail and the online
appendix for an exhaustive list of narrative events.
Greece and Cyprus are not included in the ﬁnal empirical analysis due to inconsistent availability of
intraday bond market data. The ﬁnal proxy variable is constructed only for Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.
Greek and Cypriot events are included in the proxies, however. To reiterate: local events are not included in
the proxy. Once one has ﬁltered out domestic events, events that overlap with other news and events outside
trading hours which are not headline news, the proxy variables contain between 390-450 events depending
on the country. This corresponds to 9-10 per month over the sample.
Figure 2 shows the proxy variable for Italy (i.e. the aggregated change in the Italian yield around non-
Italian events) plotted against the actual monthly change in the Italian yield; the graph is annotated with
a selection of the events that correspond to major moves in the proxy variable. The correlation coeﬃcient
14
between these two series is strong at 0.75. For the other included countries the correlation is not as strong;
ﬁgure 3 presents the graphs for Spain (correlation: 0.65), Ireland28 (correlation: 0.55) and Portugal (corre-
lation: 0.38). These correlation coeﬃcients are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. From the point of
view of the empirical strategy, what matters is not the correlation with the actual change in the bond yield
but rather with the residuals in the reduced form VAR. The online appendix contains a formal analysis of
the strength of the relationship between the proxy and the reduced form residuals of the VAR model. The
result of this analysis is that the ﬁt is suﬃciently strong such that one needs not be concerned with weak
proxy problems.
The variation in the proxy series is driven by large market reactions to a small proportion of events rather
than more moderate reactions to every piece of news. Figure 4 illustrates this by ordering all events included
in the proxies according to the square of the market reaction and then plotting the cumulative contribution
of each ordered event against the total sum of squares to produce a graph analogous to a Lorenz curve.
Reading oﬀ the chart it becomes apparent that the top 10% of events by absolute market move contribute
somewhere between 80-90%, depending on the country, of the variance of the proxy. This implies that there
are approximately 50 or so important events in each proxy; still a large number but much less than the total
number of identiﬁed events.
I also carry out a battery of stastistical checks on the proxies to see if the data matches the assumptions
underlying the identiﬁcation strategy. For the sake of brevity I again refer readers to the online appendix for
exact details regarding these analyses and the associated tables and ﬁgures.
The reason for using high frequency data is that existing public information is already reﬂected in market
prices; thus market reactions are orthogonal to preceding shocks the participants are already aware of. The
natural check of the validity of this assumption is to see whether the proxy is predictable. I do this by
running predictive regressions on the local market reaction to foreign events aggregated at weekly, biweekly
and monthly frequencies. I ﬁnd that these reactions are not explained by past events, either local or foreign,
or macroeconomic data. The message is as one would expect with rational and eﬃcient markets: historical
market moves and macroeconomic data have no predictive power over the market's reaction to current news.
As well as being unpredictable, aggregations of market reactions to foreign events should be uncorrelated
contemparaneously with reactions to local events. In the data, there is evidence of such a correlation between
market reactions to local and foreign events for the Italian bond market but not in the other countries. In
small samples spurious correlations are always possible. In this case the correlation is attributable to a
single outlier: in the month of November 2011 the collapse of the Greek and Italian governments occured
simultaneously.29 Abstracting from this observation removes the correlation.
A ﬁnal empirical test is to gauge the extent to which the foreign events included in the proxy are a reaction
to changes in local economic, monetary or ﬁscal conditions. One way to capture this is to see if the proxy is
correlated with the market reaction to local economic and ﬁscal data releases or ECB announcements. This
can be thought of as a test of whether foreign events are correlated to local macroeconomic shocks that are
being captured by a data surprise.30 The result of this analysis is negative: the proxy is uncorrelated with
data surprises.
28Irish tick data is not available between May 2011 and October 2011. In this period the Irish proxy is constructed using the
daily change in yields during foreign events that were headline news, i.e. only major events.
29There is no evidence that the collapse of Silvio Berlusconi's government was a direct consequence of George Papandreou's
resignation in November 2011 and vice versa.
30This is an imperfect test as the causality could run in the other direction; for example, events that raise yields may lower
conﬁdence and cause negative survey releases or provoke an ECB reaction.
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4 Methodology
This section lays out the econometric methodology and describes how the proxy SVAR identiﬁcation regime
in section 2 is implemented. The reduced form model follows a Bayesian panel SVAR with cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the slope coeﬃcients and covariance matrices. Implementing the proxy SVAR in a Bayesian
framework adds a layer of complexity in the sense that one cannot directly apply the two-stage procedure
used in the frequentist approach. The reduced form VAR is monthly, yet the proxy variable is best viewed
as an aggregation of censored high frequency events that are stochastic. I show how this aggregation can be
dealt with by using a leptokurtic distribution to capture the eﬀect of the censoring process when estimating
the relationship between the narrative proxy and the residuals. From here it is straightforward to derive the
likelihood of the proxy conditional on the reduced form and, using Bayes rule, the joint posterior.
The Bayesian approach has a number of advantages. First, it is suﬃciently ﬂexible so as to allow for
additional panel assumptions at the identiﬁcation stage. Second, the information from the proxy is used
when estimating the VAR coeﬃcients, even though the proxy is not directly included in the reduced form
model and, third, credible intervals can be readily constructed that include uncertainty from both the reduced
form VAR estimation and the identiﬁcation procedure.
4.1 The reduced form Panel VAR
The primary feature of the panel VAR model is to allow for heterogeneity in the slope and covariance matrices
of the country-speciﬁc models. This is done by setting up the country-speciﬁc parameters in the shape of a
hierarchy with exchangeable priors. This section sketches the model structure and oﬀers a brief justiﬁcation
for the selected priors; Jarocinski (2010) oﬀers a fuller discussion in this regard.
In order to describe the VAR structure formally the following notation is adhered to: vectors and scalars
are lower case symbols, matrices are uppercase symbols, the indices c = 1, ..., C, l = 1, ..., L and t = 1, ..., T
denote (local) countries, VAR lags and time periods (months, speciﬁcally) respectively. The dimension of the
VAR is denoted N . For each country the reduced form VAR is of the form:
yc,t =
L∑
l=1
Bc,lyc,t−l + Γczt + uc,t (2)
Where yct is aN×1 vector of endogenous country variables, Bc,l is the matrix of country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients on
lag l of the endogenous variables, zt are deterministic variables with corresponding coeﬃcient Γc and uc,t is the
vector of VAR innovations at time t. These innovations are assumed to be i.i.d. and to have a prior distribution
uc,t ∼ N(0,Σc,u), where Σc,u is a covariance matrix to be estimated. As is standard in the Bayesian VAR
literature, equation 2 can be rewritten in its SURE representation. Let xc,t = [y
′
c,t−1, ..., y
′
c,t−L]; stacking the
t observations on y
′
c,t, xc,t and z
′
t vertically to create data matrices allows the model to be expressed as:
Yc = XcBc + ZcΓc + Uc
Where Bc = [Bc,1, ...., Bc,l]'. Lastly, I deﬁne the vectorised data and parameter terms as yc = vec(Yc),
βc = vec(Bc) and γc = vec(Γc).
4.1.1 The ﬁrst level of the hierarchy
The ﬁrst level of the hierarchy governs the statistical form of the individual country models. The likelihood
for the model corresponding to country c is given by:
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p(yc|βc, γc,Σc) = N((IN ⊗Xc)βc + (IN ⊗ Zc)γc, (Σc,u ⊗ ITc)) (3)
A non-informative prior is assumed for γc in each country: p(γc) ∝ 1. The country slope coeﬃcients βc are
assumed to have an exchangeable Gaussian prior with common mean β¯ and variance Λc,β which is country
speciﬁc:
βc|β¯,Λc,β ∼ N(β¯,Λc,β)
The parameter vector β¯ serves as the cross-country mean of the slope coeﬃcients. I depart from Jarocinski
(2010) by imposing the prior that the covariance matrix of the residuals is also drawn from a common
distribution (in this case inverse-Wishart) with a common scale parameter S¯:
Σc,u|S¯, κ ∼ iW (S¯, κ) (4)
The purpose of this prior is to formalise the existence of a cross-country average covariance matrix, alongside
β¯, for use in calculating the impulse responses of the cross-country average model. This prior implies that
the posterior of S¯ can be used to estimate a cross-country covariance matrix centered around the harmonic
mean of the individual country estimates.31 The degrees of freedom parameter, κ, which is deﬁned on the
positive real line, determines the degree of shrinkage of the estimated country speciﬁc covariance matrices
towards said common mean as described below.
4.1.2 The second level of the hierarchy
The second level of the hierarchy governs the common cross-country elements, speciﬁcally the prior distribu-
tions of the hyper-parameters in the country models. I let the data determine the common means and use a
diﬀuse prior for both β¯ and S¯: p(β¯) ∝ 1 and p(S¯) ∝ |S¯|−0.5(N+1). The degree of shrinkage applied to slope
coeﬃcients βc is governed by the country-speciﬁc covariance matrices Λc,β . I assume this covariance matrix
can be decomposed into a country-speciﬁc positive deﬁnite matrix (Lc,β) and a common scale parameter
contained in the set of positive real numbers (λβ):
Λc,β = λβLc,β
The matrix Lc,β is deterministic and is constructed from the ratios of the variances of the residuals from
univariate autoregressive estimates of endogenous country variables as described in Jarocinski (2010). This
form of speciﬁcation for Lc,β adheres to a similar intuition to that behind the variance of the Minnesota prior,
the idea being that the relative variance of a coeﬃcient is determined by the relative size of the unexpected
movements of the variables in question (see Litterman (1986) for a fuller discussion).
The parameter Lc,β only helps determine the relative variances of the coeﬃcient estimates. What matters
for the tightness of the parameter estimates about the common mean is λβ . This hyperparameter acts as a
scale parameter for the overall variance of the slope parameters across countries and determines the degree
of shrinkage. To understand the impact of λβ it is useful to consider the two extreme cases. An estimate of
λβ = 0 is equivalent to saying there is no variance about β¯ - that the slope coeﬃcients are identical across
countries. This results in posterior means of βc equivalent to a homogenous panel VAR. Conversely, as
λβ → ∞ the distribution about β¯ is suﬃciently diﬀuse such that there is no information contained within
31Allowing the residuals to be correlated across countries is attractive from an eﬃciency perspective but is computationally
intensive. Re-estimating the benchmark speciﬁcation allowing for such correlations does not meaningfully alter the results thus
for computtional convienence I restrict the residuals to be uncorrelated.
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the common mean. As a result the posterior means of βc are almost equivalent to those as if each country
has been estimated separately.32 Any increase in λβ is equivalent to a reduction in shrinkage and allowing
the estimated country models to become increasingly diﬀerent. The parameter λβ , therefore, determines how
close the model is to either of the two extremes of country-speciﬁc slopes and homogenous slopes.
While it is possible to provide an interpretation as to what changes in λβ imply for the model, the
absolute level, as with the variance of VAR coeﬃcients more generally, is harder to interpret. As a result,
an informative prior for λβ is diﬃcult to justify. However, it is desirable to let the data itself speak for
how much shrinkage is needed and therefore a non-informative prior is not problematic conceptually. The
inverse-Gamma distribution has the appropriate support and delivers conditional conjugacy; this implies a
prior of:
λβ |s, v ∼ IG2 ∝ λ
−v+2
2
β exp{−
1
2
s
λβ
} (5)
with hyper-parameters s and v. The hyper-parameters are speciﬁed, as recommended Gelman (2006), such
the standard deviations for the individual coeﬃcients have a uniformly distributed prior over the positive
portion of the real line, i.e. p(λβ) ∝ λ−1/2β . This equivalent an improper prior with v = −1 and s = 0.33
The parameter κ plays a similar but inverted role to λβ for the covariance matrices. As κ → ∞ the
distribution in equation 4 becomes degenerate with all the mass concentrated upon a point corresponding
to the common mean covariance matrix (determined by S¯); hence, the posterior means of Σc,u would be
identical. As κ decreases, the country covariances are allowed to become increasingly diﬀerent, to the extent
that κ = 0 implies there is no shrinkage in terms of covariances.34
Due to the multivariate nature of the model, there is no classical distribution that can serve as a prior
on κ that is conditionally conjugate. One can attempt to use a non-informative prior for κ and simulate the
univariate non-standard conditional distribution using an adaptive rejection step in the sampling procedure.
However, this parameter appears weakly identiﬁed when estimated. Therefore, I treat κ as deterministic.
To be conservative I choose the value of N + 2 (as suggested in Giannone et al. (2012)) as it guarantees the
existence of a prior mean for Σc,u while imposing the minimum shrinkage.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
4.2.1 Aggregating high frequency events into the proxy.
Identiﬁcation relies on the proxy SVAR setup described in section 2. However, the simple linear relationship
between the proxy and the reduced form model described in equation 1 may be construed as an overly strong
assumption in the context of the strategy used here. It is also unclear what the appropriate distributional
assumption is over ther term ωt. The construction of the proxy as described in section 3.3 presents several
issues from an econometric perspective. The variable is an aggregation of high frequency bond market
reactions which are themselves stochastic. Events are not continuously observed and the event inclusion
32Note that due to the prior assumption on common covariance matrices in equation 4 the estimates of βc still depend on the
cross section even as λβ →∞.
33An alternative is to set s = ε, v = ε with ε small - i.e. approximate p(λβ) ∝ 1. This means the variance rather than the
standard deviation approaches the uniform prior. However, Gelman (2006) shows that this can have an unforeseen impact on
the posterior as the prior density has a fat right tail which places less weight on cases where the models are very similar (and
λβ is small).
34In practice, it is not possible to apply the no-shrinkage case and estimate a common mean covariance matrix that conforms
with equation 4; for the posterior distribution of S¯ to be proper it is necessary to have κ > (N − 1)/C > 0. However,
setting κ ≈ (N − 1)/C, the minimum permissible value, leaves the common covariance matrix with an almost negligible role
in determining the country speciﬁc estimates; in the model used here less than a 2% weight would be placed on the common
covariance matrix for this value of κ in the posterior mean of the covariance for each country. Thus, this restriction upon the
hyperparameter does not play a meaningful role.
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criteria means certain types of news are omitted. Thus the proxy is eﬀectively the aggregation of censored
random observations.
The market reaction may also be an imperfect gauge of the informational content of an event. Market-
speciﬁc factors such as liquidity or large transactions can result in a noisy signal. The informational content
of an event can be diﬃcult to process quickly; there is the possibility that markets treat events diﬀerently
once information is digested and change from their initial reaction. Furthermore, the market reaction may
be slowed by lags in the decision-making of institutional investors and the time taken for order books to be
processed. The immediate response to a shock may propagate as the agents in ﬁnancial markets adjust their
positions accordingly over a longer horizon. Rumours may leak in advance, attenuating the response. This
means that there will be measurement error contained in the observed reaction to each event. However, it
suggests there may be also scaling eﬀects: the initial market reaction may over- or under-shoot in a regular
fashion.
Despite the empirical issues with this high frequency set up, it is possible by making simplifying assump-
tions to return to the simple linear model in section 2. This linear framework can be used for the purposes of
identiﬁcation without any explicit estimation of the high frequency statistical process driving the bond yield
or event occurrence.
The true underlying data-generating process is continuous. However, rather than attempt to combine a
discrete time VAR and continuous events, I approximate the event-generating process by assuming it occurs
over a series of sequential, non-overlapping, discrete time windows. These windows are denoted thusly:
d = {1, 2, . . . ,M} where M is the total number of windows in the month. For the purposes of exposition
consider events at a daily frequency (d is one day); conceptually, this can be extended to a higher frequency
by simply narrowing the time window. For notational convenience the country subscript, c, is dropped for
this subsection.
Let mdt be the recorded market response on day d of month t. I assume this has the following data-
generating process:
mdt = ϑdt(ψεdt + vdt) (6)
The variable ϑdt is an indicator for censoring, taking a value of one or zero. If an event is not observed
on a particular day then no market response is recorded such that mdt (and ϑdt) take a value of zero. If
an event occurs then the observed market reaction is assumed to be the sum of the scalar structural shock,
εdt , that occurs in that time window, scaled by parameter ψ, and some independent measurement error vdt
(vdt ∼ NID(0, σ2v) ).
I follow the special case in Mertens and Ravn (2013b) and assume that the censoring process is random;
that is to say ϑdt is an independent variable that takes a value of 1 with probability p and zero otherwise
(i.e. 1− p is the probability that an observation is censored).35
I assume that the daily series of scalar structural shocks sum perfectly to create a monthly shock of
interest:
εt =
M∑
d=1
εdt
The daily structural shocks have the property: εdt ∼ NID(0, 1/M) such that the monthly shock is Gaussian
with unit variance. If one interprets εdt as a structural shock to the bond yield, this aggregation assumption
35The identiﬁcation of events does require that they are important enough to be included in international news sources. On
the other hand, announcements at the pan European level are excluded and the market does not react strongly to every event
included in the narrative.
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is equivalent to the yield following a process close to a random walk at a high frequency. The data supports
this.36 One may be concerned that the market reaction to an events decay over the course of the month; in
section 6 I show that restricting events only to the ﬁrst week in the month leads to similar results.
The monthly proxy is the aggregate of the observed market reactions:
mt =
M∑
d=1
mdt
The critical identifying assumption is that both εdt and vdt are uncorrelated with any other structural shocks
that hit the economy in month t. These assumptions are suﬃcient for the relationship between the proxy and
the structural shock to sastisfy the conditions in section 2; namely, E(mtεt) = φ, E(mtε˜t) = 0 where φ is a
scalar. The assumption of that vdt is uncorrelated with other structural shocks has two justiﬁcations. First,
time windows where important information about other shocks are revealed (e.g. data releases) are excluded.
Second, that the time windows are suﬃciently small such that any underlying correlation between yields and
the state of the economy tends to zero. Furthermore, it is assumed that E(mdtmst) = 0 and E(mtms) = 0
∀t, s.
I prove in appendix A that, given these assumptions, the relationship between mt and the reduced form
residuals, ut, is:
mt = Υ
′
ut + ωt (7)
where ωt|ut ∼ iid(0, σ2ω), Υ
′
= pψa1 and σ
2
ω = pMσ
2
v .
This returns us to the linear speciﬁcation at a monthly frequency. There is one last problem, namely that
the distribution of ω is non-Gaussian due to the censoring process. It has the same support as the normal
and retains symmetry. However, there is a diﬀerence in the fourth moment as censoring takes mass from
the tails to places it at the mean. This means the ﬁnal censored distribution is leptokurtic. A standard
approximation for symmetric, leptokurtic distribution is a Student-t.
Bayesian estimation of linear models such as equation 7, extended to include t-errors, has been covered
extensively in the literature (see Geweke (1993) for the classic treatment). LettingM be the matrix of proxy
observations stacked over time, one can approximate the conditional distribution of the proxy as:
M|U,Υ, σ2w; ν ∼ t(UΥ, σ2ωIT ; ν) (8)
Where t denotes a multivariate scaled Student's-t distribution with mean and variance given by UΥ and
σ2ωIT and a scalar degrees of freedom parameter ν. Once Υ is known, using the quadratic form a1Σua
′
1 = 1
it is again possible to use the estimate of Σu to remove the eﬀect of ψ and the censoring process, and obtain
an estimate of a1.
Extending the model away from purely random censoring to allow for the probability of being censored,
p, to depend on εdt, is technically complex. Unconditional random censoring ensures a homoskedastic, linear
relationship between the proxy and the reduced form residuals, with error of known variance, as in equation
8. Conditional censoring can be expressed in a similar way to equation 7. Υ is deﬁned diﬀerently but still has
the form φa1
′
, where φ is a scalar. The distinction is the errors are heteroskadastic conditional on the latent
high frequency shocks with no tractable analytical expression for the variance of the error term conditional
on ut. However, as is well known, one can reinterpret Studentised errors as a form heteroskedasticity; draws
36To clarify, this assumption implies that the yield should enter the VAR as the monthly close rather than the monthly
average used in the benchmark speciﬁcation. The average yield is more commonly used for macroeconomic analysis to clean
high frequency ﬂuctuations present in the close. In this paper, the results are not sensitive to using the close or the average -
or, indeed, other forms of aggregation.
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from the tail of the distribution are conceptually the same to those drawn from a distribution with higher
variance. Indeed, as discussed in the appendix, this is how the Studentised errors are implemented in practise.
4.2.2 Priors on the identiﬁcation parameters.
As much of the data entering the model is at a monthly frequency, jointly estimating the censoring process
adds an unnecessary layer of complexity. Instead, p is set deterministically and calibrated to the proportion
of the days in the sample where mdt is observed. This is equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator of
p. From the narrative series described in section 3.3 this results in a p = 0.15 (averaged across countries).
Similarly M is deterministic and is set to 30. The extent of the excess kurtosis that arises from the censoring
process is a function of only p and M . Since the degrees of freedom parameter ν determines the excess
kurtosis in the t distribution that is used to approximate the combined censored observations, this parameter
is necessarily also deterministic. Given p and M , I simulate the ω in equation 7 for arbritrary σ2v and ψ. I
then calculate ν by matching the fourth moment. Plugging in the numbers from above results in ν = 13 to the
nearest integer. It is worth emphasising the results are not too sensitive to this choice of parameter. Figure
5 illustrates this approximation by comparing the kernel density estimator of a simulated ω for arbitrary σ2v
and ψ with equivalent densities from a normal and Student-t with matched moments. Visually, for these
values of p and M , the Student-t approximation appears closer to the true density of ω when compared to
the normal.
The parameters in equation 7 are assumed to be country speciﬁc with a cross-sectional relationship along
the same lines as the parameters in the reduced form VAR. The country slope coeﬃcients Υc are assumed
to have prior normal distribution with a common mean, Υ¯, and variance, Λc,Υ, which is country-speciﬁc:
Υc|Υ¯,Λc,Υ ∼ N(Υ¯,Λc,Υ)
As previously, the variance matrix can be decomposed into a country-speciﬁc deterministic component and
a common parameter determining the degree of cross-country shrinkage across Υc, Λc,Υ = λΥLc,Υ,with Lc,Υ
set along the same lines as Lc,β . The parameter λΥ has the same prior as λβ as described in equation 5, and
plays the same role. The parameters, Υ¯, and, σ2cω, have diﬀuse priors: p(Υ¯) ∝ 1 and p(σ2cω) ∝ σ−1cω .
4.3 Discussion of the impact of the hierarchical model
For the purposes of interpreting the results and making cross-country comparisons it is useful to elaborate
on the impact of the assumed prior structure on the estimated parameters. As shown in appendix C the
exchangeable prior on the slope coeﬃcients in both the reduced form and identiﬁcation stages leads to
estimates that take a form of partial pooling: the estimated parameters have a posterior mean that is a
weighted average of the coeﬃcients of a pooled model and the parameters, as if every country model had
been estimated separately (an unpooled model).37 For the model as a whole, what determines how close
the estimation is to each extreme is the parameter λβ in the case of the reduced form slope coeﬃcients and
λΥ in the case of the identiﬁcation model. However, the extent of the pooling also varies from country to
country depending on how well each country's model ﬁts the data. This happens through two channels:
ﬁrst, in the posterior mean of each country's coeﬃcient the weight attached to the unpooled estimates is
increasing in the precision of that country's model. Thus countries that are estimated less precisely are closer
to the pooled mean. Second, the posterior mean of the pooled coeﬃcients (β¯,Υ¯) are a weighted average of
the country-speciﬁc estimates; and these weights are also increasing in the precision of each country's model.
37In the case of the βc terms there is an additional penalty term arising from the need for the reduced form residuals to ﬁt
the proxy.
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Hence, the pooled model is closer to the countries that are estimated more precisely. Given the multivariate
nature of the model it is not possible to disentangle these relative weights in a single measure as they are
parameter-speciﬁc.
Partial pooling has implications for the identiﬁcation strategy. It implies that in a country where the
proxy variable is not leading to a precise estimate of Υc, information from other countries is used to tighten
the conﬁdence bands and pin down the estimate. Thus, the proxy variable does not need to have a very
strong correlation with the true structural shock in every country in the sample so long as it works for some
countries and the countries in the sample are suﬃciently similar.
4.4 Estimation
An advantage of working with the A matrix for the proxy SVAR is that joint likelihood of the data is
heirarchical and straightforward to deﬁne. To simplify the notation deﬁne the parameter space in the model
as Θ, the set of data used in the reduced form VAR as Y = {Y1, . . . , YC , X1, . . . , XC , Z1, . . . , ZC} and the
proxy variables asM = {M1, . . . ,MC}. By Bayes rule the likelihood of the data is equal to the product of the
likelihood of the proxy variables conditional on both the reduced form model and data and the likelihood of the
reduced form model unconditional on the proxy: p(M, Y |Θ) = p(M|Y,Θ)p(Y |Θ) = ∏c p(Mc|Yc,Θ)p(Yc|Θ).
The form of p(Yc|Θ) is given in equation 3. The condition density of the proxy, p(Mc|Yc,Θ), is deﬁned in
equation 8. As is well known, regression with Student-t errors can be rephrased as a mixture of normals.
Therefore p(Mc|Yc,Θ) is Gaussian and from above p(Yc|Θ) is Gaussian; hence, the joint density, p(Mc, Yc|Θ),
is also Gaussian.
For estimation, the unconditional densities of the parameters cannot be determined analytically, hence
they are computed numerically using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. The functional forms of the priors,
as well as having an interpretation regarding a common average model, are motivated by computational
convenience as they are conditionally conjugate; that is to say they lead to a set of conditional posterior
distributions that are standard and of the same family as the prior. This motivates the use of a Gibbs
Sampler to construct the posteriors. The full form of the sampling algorithm is laid out in appendix C.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Speciﬁcation
The panel VAR described above is run using a sample of four crisis-hit Euro Area countries: Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. The panel is balanced and covers a time period from January 2008 to March 2013.
Regarding the included variables, the starting point is the standard monetary policy VAR. Output is proxied
on a monthly basis using the unemployment rate and a broad index of industrial production including the
manufacturing, energy, utilities and construction sector. Prices are taken as the headline HICP reading.
These datasets are provided by Eurostat. The monetary policy stance is captured using the 3-mth Eurepo
rate. The series is computed as monthly average of the European Banking Federation's daily ﬁxing and is
not country-speciﬁc. As a collateralised lending rate Eurepo ameliorates the heightened level of counterparty
risk that has disrupted the interbank market since August 2007.
Given the context of this paper, it is natural to also include the borrowing cost of local sovereign. This is
captured by the monthly average yield of the benchmark 10-year bond in each country. A measure to pick up
the long-run risk-free rate is also required. This is a diﬃcult series to capture during the crisis. The German
bond yield is inappropriate as it may have a negative convertibility premium embedded. Instead, the 10
year overnight interest rate swap (OIS), with EONIA as the ﬂoating leg, is used. This long-term measure of
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risk-free nominal interest rates also has the advantage of capturing, to an extent, the impact of the ECB's
non-standard measures on the monetary policy stance.38
To capture the impact of elevated sovereign borrowing costs on private ﬁnancial conditions in a concise
manner a composite measure of the private cost of ﬁnance is used. This is calculated as the weighted average
in the cost of equity, debt securities and bank credit for non-ﬁnancial corporations and households in each
country. The series is computed internally by the ECB by weighting yields on the various sources of ﬁnance
in accordance with ﬂows of new lending.
Lastly, as a measure of the ﬁscal stance, the monthly general government primary balance is included as
an annualised percentage of nominal GDP. The comparable ﬁscal data (across the countries) is only available
at a quarterly basis from the ﬂow of funds dataset available in Eurostat (net/lending or borrowing by the
general government sector plus interest payments). However, all four countries publish monthly ﬁscal data
using a variety of deﬁnitions. To generate a monthly ﬁscal series that has the same deﬁnition across countries
I use the regression based interpolation methodology of Mitchell et al. (2005) on the quarterly series using
the country speciﬁc monthly ﬁscal balances as interpolands. A deﬁcit is a negative reading. Exact details of
the data sources and their construction are laid out in appendix B.4.
This sets N = 8. The set of deterministic variables, Z, is set to include only a constant for all countries.
The trended series (the CPI and Industrial Production) enter the VAR in log year-on-year diﬀerences; other
series are included in levels. The lag length L is set to 2.39
The posterior is simulated using 600,000 draws from the MCMC sampler in the appendix; the ﬁrst
100,000 are discarded as a burn-in and the remaining chain is thinned by a factor of 50 leaving 10,000 draws
for inference. Results presented are the median of the 10,000 retained draws and 95% uncertainty bands are
computed using standard Bayesian Monte-Carlo methods.40
As with most VARs, the model can be used to produce three main results of interest. The impulse response
analysis provides an assessment of the propagation of systemic shocks to the included variables. Variance
decompositions give an indication of the relative importance of systemic shocks in explaining unanticipated
ﬂuctuations in the included variables. Last is a counterfactual analysis: by identifying a time-series of
systemic shocks one can reconstruct the dataset omitting the impact these shocks have had on the included
variables. This allows for an estimate of the contribution of systemic shocks to the borrowing costs and
unemployment rates in the crisis-hit countries.
5.2 Benchmark impulse responses and variance decompositions
Figure 6 presents the impulse responses to a systemic shock scaled to be consistent with a 100bps increase
in 10-year bond yield on impact to the mean country model (constructed from the estimates of β¯, Σ¯ and Υ¯).
Several features are apparent. Systemic shocks propagate a little with regard to government bond yields,
with a peak of 1.2ppt after one month before declining steadily such that after 9 months the impact has
dissipated. Part of the explanation for this correction may lie in the soothing impact of policy: monetary
easing follows the shock, albeit with a lag, with a peak response of a 40bp decline in the Eurepo and 10 year
38As with Eurepo, the EONIA rate is less distorted by concerns by counterparty risk due to the short maturity of the loan.
However, the OIS is still an imperfect measure. For example, it is not clear how the contracts would be honoured in the event
of Euro break-up - see Nordvig and Firoozye, 2012. However, the OIS has less apparent embedded risk of redomination when
compared to the German bond.
39Due to the short sample period and the medium scale of the model a parsimonious lag selection procedure is appropriate.
The lag order is determined by testing up: starting by setting L = 1 and adding more lags until the median estimated residuals
display no serial correlation. This lag-selection matches the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion assessed on the panel version of the VAR
with homogenous slope coeﬃcients and covariance matrix. So, L = 2, it is robust to alternative lag selection criteria. In the
online appendix I present robustness checks to alternative lag lengths.
40The algorithm appears to mix well; the standard diagnostic tests are passed. I refer readers to the online appendix for
convergence diagnostics.
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OIS rates after 4 months. The unemployment response is statistically insigniﬁcant on impact but the shock
propagates and leads to a peak of 0.9ppt after 7 months. The response is also persistent, taking 18 months to
return to zero. The industrial production (output) does not respond signiﬁcantly on impact but the growth
rate declines by 2ppt after 4 months. Inﬂation does not react on a statistically signiﬁcant basis.
To give better context to the results, it is worthwhile attempting to rephrase the impact on the monthly
measures of output in terms of GDP. Recent estimates of Okun's law in Europe during the crisis period (see
for example Ball et al. (2013)) suggest a coeﬃecient of around 0.5, so the unemployment response is consistent
with a 1.8ppt GDP reduction at the peak. For the countries in question industrial production is about twice
as volatile as GDP over the sample period, so the industrial production response is consistent with 1.0ppt oﬀ
GDP growth. These two responses are not completely consistent in scale but given the uncertainty involved
in the estimates they are not too dissimilar.
Figure 7 presents the results of country-speciﬁc models. What stands out is the similarity of the responses.
This suggests the data is returning a model which is close to the mean country estimates. The impulses
are similar across across countries both in terms of the impact response and the dynamics that follow,
thereby supporting a model which is close to a slope homogeneity assumption in both the reduced form and
identiﬁcation stages. This is also evidence that the countries did behave similarly in response to increases in
sovereign risk during the crisis period.
In a model with improper priors it is not possible to construct standard Bayesian likelihood ratio tests
on a pooled versus partially pooled model, and a switch to a model with weakly informative priors can lead
to unforeseen consequences - indeed it can bias the results away from the fully pooled case (see Gelman
(2006)). An alternative, suggested by Jarocinski (2010), is to rely on the deviance information criterion
(DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) which summarises the trade-oﬀ between the improvements in ﬁt from
not imposing homogenous parameters against the over parameterisation that may arise from partial pooling.
The DIC is simply a sum of the expected deviance, a measure of ﬁt related to the mean square error, and the
eﬀective number of parameters, which in the context of the hierarchical model with ﬂat priors is close to the
actual number of parameters in the fully pooled model; see Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) for a full discussion of
this criterion and how to calculate it. The smaller it is the better the model; in the case of the panel used
here partial pooling returns a DIC of 144.19, while the fully-pooled model returns a DIC of 272.90 and the
country by country estimate returns 938.40. This suggests that partial pooling is eﬀective even if inspection
of the impulse responses conﬁrms that the optimal degree of shrinkage is quite large and is close to a slope
homogeneity assumption.41
Figure 8 presents forecast error variance decompositions, i.e. the portion of forecast error in each variable
that is explained by the systemic shock at various horizons, for both the mean and country-speciﬁc models.
The decomposition reveals that on impact around 50% of the variation in the bond yield is explained by
the shock. At longer-term horizons the importance of shock for the variance of yields seems to dissipate;
this matches the impulse responses. A second ﬁnding of note is that 45% of the forecast error variance of
unemployment is explained at a forecast horizon of 6 months. This suggests there are more persistent conse-
quences of the shock and that this form of shock has contributed heavily to the variation in unemployment
over the crisis period.
In terms of other variables, systemic shocks explain around 35% of the variation in the private cost
of ﬁnance on impact, but the eﬀect disappears quickly at longer horizons. Little of the variation in the
remaining series can be explained by the shock. Given the unemployment response this is a little surprising.
Indeed, the output (industrial production) variance decomposition is quite small in relation to the response
of unemployment when one considers that they are both a proxy for cyclical conditions in the economy. An
41The results from the fully pooled and partially pooled model are available in the online appendix.
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explanation could simply be that industrial production is a noisy series and thus a greater proportion of its
forecast error is explained by its own volatility.
This result - that the systemic shocks were an important driver of unemployment dynamics over the crisis
periods - raises the question: what are the key channels by which elevated sovereign yields feed into the
economy? In terms of the ﬁscal channel, on impact the systemic shock reduces the balance (an increase in
the deﬁcit) in all countries. This result is not distinguishable from zero in the mean the country model or
in Italy and Portugal; but it is in Spain and Ireland. Since the series is the primary balance this is not an
automatic response to a higher interest burden. Instead, it is likely a reﬂection of lower revenues due to a
weakening economy. Policy seems to quickly correct for this; the balance is back to zero after 5-6 months in
both countries. There is not an over-correction though; increasing borrowing costs do not lead to a positive
response in the primary balance.
It is worth considering, therefore, if this represents evidence of a lack of austerity in response to higher
borrowing costs. Note that the primary balance is back to zero at the point where the unemployment response
peaks. So if one deﬁnes an austerity package as an adjustment in the cyclically adjusted primary balance
then austerity is taking place on that basis. Therefore, one cannot rule out a ﬁscal channel, but the evidence
is only suﬃcient to say that increases in sovereign borrowing costs inhibit automatic stabilisers, and not that
there is absolute ﬁscal tightening.
A couple of further channels emerge from the literature; ﬁrst, that sovereign debt crises are often associated
with damage to the ﬁnancial system and banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) and De Paoli et al.
(2009)).42 Sovereign bonds are used for collateral by banks; any fall in their value constrains the supply
of liquidity to the banking system. Losses on bonds also reduce bank capital and constrain the supply of
credit to the private sector. Private sector bonds are also aﬀected. The notion of the sovereign ceiling (see
Durbin and Ng (2005)) suggests that no corporate bond should yield less than their sovereign (due to the
risk of expropriation). Corsetti et al. (2013) embed the notion that sovereign risk impacts the private cost
of ﬁnance, which they describe as a sovereign risk channel, into a New Keynesian model with ﬁnancial
frictions where private ﬁnancial conditions are inherently linked to changes in sovereign risk premia. Under
these circumstances, the intensiﬁcation of a debt crisis acts as a form of ﬁnancial shock curtailing private
demand.
A second mechanism that emerges from the literature on debt crisis is an external channel: the crisis
reduces access to foreign markets. Countries experiencing debt crises often lose access to international capital
markets (Arteta and Hale (2008)) and experience sharp declines in bilateral trade (Rose (2005)). Mendoza
and Yue (2012) argue that this can result in a mechanism that inhibits the supply side of the economy: the
loss of imported inputs which can not be substituted for domestically acts as a productivity shock, similar
to a working capital channel.43
These two channels are not mutually exculsive but is worthwhile exploring whether they are apparent in
the data. I augment the VAR to explore these issues further.
5.2.1 The sovereign risk channel
In the benchmark speciﬁcation the pass-through of a systemic shock that raises sovereign yields by 100bps
onto private borrowing costs is less than one-for-one: yields on private ﬁnance increase by only 40bp on impact
and the eﬀect is short-lived as with the sovereign yield. An explanation for this lies with the composition
of the data. The Eurozone private sector largely ﬁnances itself using bank loans and as a result these rates
42Indeed, as Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011) describe, it is often ﬁnancial stress that leads to sovereign crises.
43As a clarifying remark: Mendoza and Yue (2012) refer to epsiodes of default rather than just a high sovereign risk premia.
However, the empirical stylised facts used to motivate their mechanism are not restricted to default episodes and can be
generalised in this context.
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have a high weight in the composite cost of ﬁnance. However, bank lending rates are also sticky and slow to
respond to market conditions.
To explore the sovereign risk channel in more detail I augment the benchmark VAR by decomposing the
composite cost of ﬁnance index into its three components. The average interest rate on loans and corporate
bonds can be extracted as a component of the ECB composite cost of ﬁnance. As the equity yield is not
consistently available over the sample this is substituted for using the year-on-year change in the headline
equity price for each country sourced from Eurostat. To account for the potential stickiness in loan rates it is
important to include a variable that captures quantities of private ﬁnance as well as its price. The supply of
loans by local banks to the domestic non-ﬁnancial private sector is included for this purpose (sourced from
the ECB).44
Figure 9 presents the mean country impulse response functions for VAR augmented with these four
additional variables. The corporate bond yields respond a little more than one for one as compared to the
sovereign: on impact the yields increase by about 130bps. Corporate yields also follow a similar dynamic in
response to the shock. This result is consistent with the idea of a sovereign ceiling (see, for example, Durbin
and Ng (2005)) where a country's corporates can never borrow more cheaply than their sovereign, and where
this would imply at least a one to one response to a shock to the sovereign risk premium.45 Equity prices
fall with a peak decline of 7 percentage points. The two market-based variables seem to have large reactions.
Loan rates react to a smaller extent in contrast, rising by around 25bp. However, there is a simultaneous
decline in the quantity of credit: at its lowest ebb credit growth falls by around 1 percentage point. The
responses of the original variables in the VAR are similar to the benchmark.
These results conﬁrm that systemic shocks pass through into the domestic private ﬁnancial system.
Furthermore, the variance decomposition in ﬁgure 8 provides evidence that the shocks were a signiﬁcant
driver in the ﬂuctuation in private ﬁnancial conditions during the crisis. The sovereign risk channel appears
to play an important role.
5.2.2 The external channel
A distinctive feature of the Euro Area debt crisis when compared to other debt crises is the presence of the
ECB as an external source of ﬁnance. Euro area countries suﬀering from the crisis were less vulnerable to
sudden stops of external private capital ﬂows due to the ability of their domestic ﬁnancial institutions to
use the ECB's liquidity operations to obtain central bank ﬁnancing. This source of ﬁnance is limited only
by the eligible collateral available to the domestic banking system. One way to gauge this substitution of
private capital for oﬃcial ﬁnancing is the change in the country's national central bank's balance with the
wider Eurosystem, otherwise known as the change in the Target 2 balance. This is available at a monthly
frequency from Steinkamp and Westermann (2012). I rescale these ﬁgures into a percentage GDP term,
where a negative ﬁgure is equivalent to a liability.46
I attempt to capture the trade eﬀects of systemic shocks using monthly goods trade data. I take the
44Outstanding loans are calculated as a notional stock based on transactions to remove revaluations eﬀects.
45Durbin and Ng (2005) do show that some corporates can escape the sovereign ceiling if they have large external operations
or export earnings. However, this eﬀect will be lost in this data as bond index used is an aggregation of corporate issuers in the
country in question.
46To see why this is true: imagine a situation where investors withdraw deposits from a Spanish bank and deposit them in a
German bank. The German bank then holds these new deposits as reserves at the Bundesbank. Correspondingly, the Spanish
bank needs to replace the lost funding and therefore goes to the Bank of Spain to borrow collateralised at the its discount
window. This leaves the Bundesbank with a liability (the reserves of the German bank) and the Bank of Spain with an asset
(the lending to the Spanish bank). The Bank of Spain ﬁnances its asset by borrowing from the Eurosystem (a Target 2 liability)
while the Bundesbank lends the deposited reserves to the rest of the Eurosystem (a Target 2 asset). This clears the Eurosystem
balance sheet. In eﬀect, what we observe is a central bank loan from the Bundesbank to the Bank of Spain of the same size as
the private capital ﬂight. Although neither institution is speciﬁcally authorising such a transaction, it is just a feature of the
Eurosystem.
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trade balance (as a % GDP) of imports (as a % GDP) and leave exports as the balancing item. To explore
the external channel, I augment the benchmark VAR with these three additional variables and reestimate
the model. Figure 10 presents the mean country impulse response functions. As above, the responses of the
original endogenous variables in the VAR are similar to the benchmark.
The observed decline in the Target 2 balance is consistent with private capital ﬂight worth 1.9% of GDP
on impact and 1.8% the following month - i.e. private capital worth 3.7% of GDP leaves the country. There
is no correction. The outﬂow appears permanent in this sample. The loss of private external capital may
be a further cause for the sovereign risk channel observed above. Replacing largely uncollateralised private
ﬁnance with collaterised borrowing from the Eurosystem has the potential to impose an additional source of
stress on the local ﬁnancial system if some ﬁnancial institutions are collateral constrained.
There is also evidence that systemic shocks generate an external adjustment: the trade balance improves
by about 0.6% of GDP on impact and has a relatively persistent response. Imports decline by about 0.7%
of GDP. The move in the balance and imports suggests that exports either experience a small decline or
are about stable. The results are consistent with the mechanisms highlighted by Mendoza and Yue (2012);
speciﬁcally, capital ﬂight and a decline in imports.
However, while the evidence supports the existence of both channels it is not clear which, if either, is
dominant. Mendoza and Yue (2012)'s working capital channel is supply-driven while Corsetti et al. (2013)
rely on the impact disruption to the ﬁnancial system has on demand. A natural way to distinguish between
the two is to look at the inﬂation response; however, in the benchmark this is indistinguishable from zero.
If the working capital eﬀect was the dominant channel by which the elevation in sovereign yields inﬂuence
the real side of the economy then the impact would be inﬂationary. In some speciﬁcations, such as the one
presented in ﬁgure 9. and some of the alternative speciﬁcations presented in the online appendix, inﬂation
does increase in response to the shock. So a supply driven mechanism is potentially present in the data, but
the result is not robust. It is also worth noting that the inﬂation response is a potentially imperfect test in
this context due to the reliance on increases on indirect taxes as a ﬁscal measure during the crisis.
5.3 Counterfactual analyses
In order to gauge the extent of the contribution of systemic shocks to changes in the observed time series
of macroeconomic variables in the crisis-hit countries, a simple counterfactual analysis is carried out. For
each draw from the posterior distribution of the parameter space, a time series of systemic shocks for each
country is extracted. From there the corresponding draws of the slope coeﬃcients, covariance matrix and
identiﬁcation equation coeﬃcients can be used to remove the impact of these shocks from the data. This
is equivalent to a counterfactual dataset where no systemic shocks occurred over the course of the whole
sample. As this is exercise carried out for every draw from the posterior, the model produces a simulated
distribution of the premia which enables the calculation of credible intervals. I ﬁrst focus my attention
on the counterfactual sovereign bond yields and then switch attention to macroeconomic consequences by
considering counterfactual unemployment rates.
Figure 11 presents the results of this analysis on the bond yields for the four countries in the sample;
on the top panel is the actual versus median counterfactual for the 10-year bond; the bottom panel has the
diﬀerence between the two alongside accompanying Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. For want of a better term,
I refer to this diﬀerence between the true sovereign bond yield and its counterfactual equivalent as a systemic
premium. It is important to emphasise that this systemic premium is a deviation from the sample baseline
caused by the systemic shocks, rather than an absolute level of systemic sovereign risk.
Several points stand out. First, and as one would expect, there is little evidence of a sustained systemic
premium in any of the countries prior to the start of the crisis in 2009; the estimated premium ﬂuctuates
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around zero and for the most part is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, once the crisis intensiﬁes signiﬁcant
positive premia are apparent with peaks of the median estimate at 97bp for Spain, 127bp for Italy, 381bp for
Portugal and 383bp in Ireland. Taking this into consideration, between 40-60% of the trough-to-peak move
in yields across the four countries can be explained by systemic shocks. This order of magnitude is about
what one would expect given the variance decomposition result; the model is consistent in this respect.
The pattern varies across countries; Italy suﬀers from two periods of high systemic premia, ﬁrst over the
autumn of 2011 and then in the spring of 2012. Both periods are contemporaneous with political instability in
Greece, with the fall of the country's government followed by an indeterminate election. Spanish premia also
peak around the Greek election and in November 2011 but are not signiﬁcant at any other point. Portugal
and Ireland suﬀer an extended run of elevated premia peaking around the summer of 2011 before declining
relatively steadily towards the end of the sample. By the end of the sample (March 2013) there are no positive
statistically signiﬁcant systemic premia in any of the countries considered. It was a reduction in the actual
yield that achieved this reduction in the premia rather than a rise in the counterfactual. Indeed, counterfactual
yields appear to fall towards the end of the sample - which can be interpreted as an improvement in economic
or monetary conditions lowering sovereign borrowing costs.
In Portugal, the counterfactual suggests that the yield should be slightly higher than observed , to the
extent that the systemic premia is statistically signiﬁcant - and negative - near the end of the sample. This
eﬀect lasts for only a month so it may be spurious. However, it is worthwhile making the point that while
this may seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst glance, a negative reading is not inexplicable. If one interprets the
systemic premia as investors' beliefs about the strength of multilateral cooperation and commitment to the
Eurozone as an entity, then ﬁnancial markets can just as easily believe that strong policy interventions on a
European level justify yields less than local fundamentals suggest. Indeed, that may be an interpretation for
the origin story for the crisis.
Figure 12 presents counterfactuals for the unemployment rates in the four countries in the sample. As
above, the top panel is the actual versus median counterfactual for the unemployment rate; the bottom panel
has the diﬀerence between the two alongside accompanying Bayesian conﬁdence intervals. As is evident from
the data unemployment rises sharply at the start of the sample, stabilises then rises again. This pattern
is apparent with slight variations in intensity and timing across countries. In the early part of the sample,
2008-2009, actuals and counterfactuals align tightly. This is to be expected. For example, one would not
anticipate that the 10 percentage point rise in unemployment in Spain between 2008 and 2009 was explained
by an innovation to the riskiness of the sovereign. A ﬁnancial shock during the initial intensiﬁcation of the
crisis appears the more likely culprit.
However, once tensions begin to arise in the sovereign debt market observed unemployment rates begin to
distance themselves from their counterfactual equivalents in a manner distinguishable from zero. This occurs
in mid-2010 in Ireland and Portugal and in mid-to-late 2011 in Spain and Italy which is roughly in line with
when the crisis reached those countries plus a few months to allow a pass through to the unemployment
rate. By the end of the sample unemployment is 4 percentage points higher than it would have been in the
absense of the systemic shocks in Portugal and Ireland and around 1-1.5 percentage points higher in Italy
and Spain. If one considers the rise in unemployment since the mid-2010 around a third of the move in
Spain is explained by systemic shocks with an equivalent ﬁgure of one quarter for Italy. In Portugal almost
all the recent rise can be attributed to systemic shocks while the dynamics in Ireland are dramatic: the
model predicts that unemployment would have fell markedly in the absence of systemic shocks. In all, the
unemployment counterfactuals reaﬃrm that sovereign risk was an important driver of this variable over the
crisis period matching the evidence from the variance decompositions.
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5.4 Discussion and Policy Implications
From a policy perspective a couple of discussion points emerge from these results. Firstly, it is clear that an
increase in sovereign risk premia does pass through to private ﬁnancial conditions. Although the results are
conditional on the policy regime in place, this evidence does support the notion that measures to insulate
the private ﬁnancial system from the riskiness of the sovereign are eﬀective.
Second, the response of policymakers to the crisis has been to focus on ﬁscal consolidation in order to
lower sovereign risk premia. The argument in favour of doing so lies in the concept of expansionary austerity:
that the fall in government borrowing costs will more than outweigh the negative eﬀects of contractionary
ﬁscal consolidation. This paper provides some evidence to quantify the ﬁrst half of this argument, the impact
of a fall in yields on the economy. Detailed reviews of the evidence for the second half of this argument, i.e.
the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on output, are available elsewhere in the literature. For example, Ramey (2011a)
suggests a probable range for spending multipliers between 0.8 and 1.5 for the US and, crucially, over sample
periods where government borrowing was not constrained such that there was little feedback from the ﬁscal
stance to the sovereign risk premia. Therefore, these estimates represent the eﬀect of changes in ﬁscal policy
conditional of no change in sovereign borrowing costs. Hebous (2011) suggests a similar range for spending
shocks, based on a review of evidence including those based on international estimates, and slightly larger
number for tax shocks - again considering studies estimated during periods government's had ﬁscal space.
Consider the lower bound on the ﬁscal multiplier proposed by Ramey (2011a), and the upper bound of
the output eﬀect of a 100bps decrease in borrowing costs, which is 1.8ppt extra GDP (based on the unem-
ployment response). Under these circumstances a 1% ﬁscal adjustment needs to promote a 45bp reduction
in the sovereign risk premium in order to be expansionary. This is a conservative estimate; under adverse
economic conditions, and with a constrained/external monetary authority, the ﬁscal multiplier is potentially
much larger.47 Further, the output response to a reduction in yields is diminished if one uses the industrial
production reading. Empirically, the relationship between government borrowing costs and ﬁscal fundamen-
tals is highly non-linear (see Corsetti et al. (2013)).48 As a result, it is diﬃcult to assess whether a 45bp
reaction is a realistic market reaction to 1% of GDP less debt under the circumstances associated with the
crisis. I leave this issue to future research.
A third policy-related issue is the diﬀerence between the actual and counterfactual bond yield. One
possible interpretation for why sovereign borrowing costs diverge from local economic conditions is self-
fulﬁlling expectations of default. An alternative is that it reﬂects convertibility premia due to concerns over
the future of the single currency. However, either interpretation can be used to justify interventions and
oﬃcial sector ﬁnancing. The size of the systemic premia provide evidence that sovereign borrowing costs had
divorced themselves from a level justiﬁed by the underlying local macroecomic situation. It is also telling
that the decline in the premia coincides, particularly in Italy and Spain, with a period of ECB action over the
summer of 2012 culminating in the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions in September. This
evidence supports the ECB's intervention and suggests it was eﬀective in bringing yields back towards a more
neutral setting thereby soothing the crisis. This is not to say that all the increase in sovereign borrowing
costs seen during the crisis period were not due to macroeconomic conditions, as is clearly evidenced by the
increase in the counterfactual yield.
5.5 Comparison with the literature
Neri and Ropele (2013) represents the closest paper in terms of approach and topic to this work. Qualitatively
47See Christiano et al. (2011) and Rendahl (2012) for a theoretical discussion. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) oﬀer some
empirical evidence.
48Bi (2012) oﬀers some theoretical interpretation for this relationship.
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their main results agree with those described herein: increase in sovereign risk premia are bad for industrial
production growth and unemployment and reduce credit to the private sector (although, they do not shed light
on the ﬁscal response or capital ﬂows). The exact size of the responses they report are not directly comparable
to those seen here; for example, in their benchmark case they consider a 350bp increase in the Greek yield.
However, one can attempt to back out the responses: for example, they report their benchmark shock raised
Italian borrowing costs by 60bp and results in a 1.2ppt decline in industrial production growth which is
consistent with the results above. Other point estimates from their results diﬀer, however; for example,
Spanish industrial production responds more strongly, Irish less so. Their estimates of the unemployment
response is also much larger in all the countries in question. Uribe and Yue (2006) carry out an investigation
of the business cycle impact of innovations to country risk premia in emerging markets. They document the
negative output eﬀects of such shocks and show an improvement in the trade balance. They also ﬁnd that
such innovations explain a fair portion of business cycle dynamics in emerging economies, that is, around 12%
- this is smaller than here but their sample contains non-crisis periods. The results presented in this paper
also chime with Levy Yeyati and Panizza (2011), where fear of default can be very costly for an economy,
and not just default itself.
In terms of the counterfactual systemic premia, the results are not directly comparable to the systemic
component calculated in Ang and Longstaﬀ (2013), as the counterfactuals are obviously relative to a baseline
level of systemic risk. However, the fact that 50% of the short-term variance in yields is explained by the
shock is consistent with Ang and Longstaﬀ (2013). The systemic premia can also be compared with the large
number of papers (see the literature review) assessing the extent to which the movements in bond yields in
the Euro Area during the crisis was explained by local macroeconomic fundamentals. The answer from this
paper is around half was and half was not. The remainder of the literature contains a variety of views.
6 Sensitivity analysis
This section presents two sensitivity checks for the empirical benchmark empirical results delineated in the
previous section; ﬁrst, how diﬀerent assumptions over the construction of the proxy can aﬀect the results is
explored; and second, a placebo is study carried out to show that the results are not as due to of simply
oversampling of the bond yield at a high frequency. For the sake of brevity the results of these analyses are
presented only as impulse responses for the mean country model; variance decompositions and counterfactuals
are a function of the impulse responses so it is suﬃcient to focus our attention on this aspect of the model.
Additional robustness checks regarding the speciﬁcation are presented in the online appendix.
The sensitivity checks do not qualitatively alter the message presented above. However, quantitatively
the benchmark speciﬁcation is an outlier with respect to the unemployment response. While the alternative
speciﬁcations concur with the pattern of unemployment in response to the shock, other speciﬁcations, as
presented in ﬁgures 9 and 10 for example, have a peak response of around 0.6ppt when compared to 0.9ppt
in the benchmark case. This is in response to a systemic shock that raises the bond yield by 100bp. Corre-
spondingly, these alternative speciﬁcations suggest that around 30% of the forecast error of unemployment is
explained by systemic shocks. Interestingly, an unemployment increase of 0.6ppt is actually consistent with
the 2.0ppt fall of industrial production growth (which is robust to alternative speciﬁcations) when one places
it in GDP terms. Therefore, the benchmark may be overstating the unemployment response somewhat.
6.1 Alternative proxies
Construction of the proxy in section 3.3 involved several assumptions that should be tested for robustness. The
ﬁrst alternative proxy is constructed in one hour windows rather than 20 minute windows. This alternative
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gives markets longer to react to events at the cost of potentially capturing moves unrelated to the event in
question. The second alternative proxy dispenses intraday day data altogether and just considers the daily
change in the yield on days where then is a headline event; i.e. the ones that make the top of the morning
news brieﬁng. Essentially, this looks at the daily reaction to what journalists perceive as the most important
events. The third alternative proxy only uses events related to Greece. Greece is a small country from a Euro
area perspective; thus real and ﬁnancial linkages between it and the countries in the sample should play less
of a role in determining bond market reactions. The fourth alternative proxy excludes all events that happen
outside of trade hours.
The ﬁfth alternative proxy drops all events involving foreign agents intervening in a local country; e.g.
the Troika agreeing to bailout a particuluar country. Including events of this nature could be considered
questionable given exogeneity assumptions underpinning the identiﬁcation strategy. While it is plausible to
argue that the market's reaction to domestic news in Greece, for example, is not caused by shocks in other
Eurozone countries; it is harder to say the same for international policymakers who may be internalising the
entire currency union when making their decisions. In the benchmark case, these events are included but a
simple robustness check is to remove events falling into this category and rerun the model.
The last alternative proxy just looks at events that happen in the ﬁrst week of the month. This is
designed as a robustness check against the assumption that market reactions are persistant over the course
of the month - a proxy based on events early in the month would be ineﬀective if reactions decayed in a
meaningful fashion. Using early events also serves to strengthen the identifying assumptions further. If the
market reaction to a foreign event is partly a function of preceding local structural economic shocks, by
looking just at events early in the month there is less opportunity for foreign agents to react to the local
shocks that happen that month and subsequently act upon them. This is a similar line of reasoning to what
one would employ with regard to a causal ordering for SVAR identiﬁcation. By looking at the ﬁrst week, one
can make a stronger case for the proxy moving ﬁrst as it were.
All the alternative proxies remove events that overlap with local data, local events, ECB meetings and
pan-European events as in the benchmark case. The speciﬁcation of the reduced form model is held constant
at the benchmark.
Figure 13 presents the median responses of the mean country model under the alternative proxy deﬁnitions
overlaid on the benchmark speciﬁcation with corresponding conﬁdence intervals. The top set of impulses
contain the ﬁrst two alternative proxies; the bottom set the last three. The alternative proxies are closely
correlated with the benchmark, so unsurprisingly the results turn out much the same regardless of the proxy
used. There are quantitative diﬀerences but qualitatively the message is the same. Furthermore, nearly all
the median alternative impulse responses are within conﬁdence set of the benchmark.
6.2 Placebo study
Given that there are approximately 400 events included in the proxy, a valid concern is that the approach
taken here is simply sampling the actual changes in the yield. If this were the case, the proxy would simply
be a noisy measure of the overall change in the month rather than picking up any particular shock. This is
equivalent to just treating the yield as contemporaneously exogenous but badly measured. With 400 events
in the proxy, approximately 4% of the trading time during the sample period is covered by the event windows
chosen. However, the question of whether the 4% coverage is suﬃciently small to rule out this potential
sampling problem is not possible to answer from a theoretical basis. Hence I attempt to verify it empirically
using a placebo study.
The solution taken is to recreate the benchmark proxy in an identical fashion using the same event time
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but one trading day previously.49 This retains something close to the same distribution of events across the
months in the sample but gives a diﬀerent set of placebo market reactions not in the vicinity of the original
event. These new windows may overlap with other windows in the benchmark proxy, if events happen on
sequential days, but this is exactly the sort of sampling problem we wish to account for so no adjustment is
made. For the same reason, and unlike in the benchmark case, no attempt to drop any other overlaps, for
example with local data or local events, is made.
Figure 14 presents a comparison of the mean country impulses based on the placebo proxy against that
with the benchmark proxy holding the reduced form speciﬁcation constant. The ﬁrst point to note is that
none of the responses are distinguishable from zero (excluding the response of the sovereign yield which has
to be due to the scaling assumption). Second, although the pattern of median impulses looks somewhat
similar, the scale of the error bands is completely diﬀerent to the benchmark. This reﬂects the inaccuracy of
the identiﬁcation stage of the model when using the placebo. The response on impact depends on the relative
size of the parameters in Υ¯. These estimates are close to zero as the reduced form residuals have almost no
explanatory power over the proxy. However, when they are rescaled to be consistent with a 100bp increase
in yields, the size of the response can become overly large as this involves dividing through by a parameter
which is itself close to zero.
The poor performance of the placebo indicates the data collection procedure is not equivalent to just
generating a noisy measure of the bond yield at time t; there is real information contained within the
benchmark proxy.
The placebo study also supports the assumption that the measurement error associated with the proxy, vdt
in equation 6, is uncorrelated with other structural shocks in the economy. The placebo is an aggregation of
randomly sampled high frequency bond market reactions. Conceptually, this can be written as an aggregation
of censored observations on vdt. The lack of meaningful responses produced by the placebo suggests its
correlation with any structural shock is weak.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of the macroeconomic implications of sovereign risk premia by using narrative
methods to identify ﬂuctuations in bond yields that appear separate from economic conditions. This addresses
an identiﬁcation problem in the literature: discriminating between changes in the riskiness of the sovereign
that is itself a function of macroeconomic conditions and the macroeconomic implications of ﬂuctuations in
sovereign risk. The high frequency, narrative identiﬁcation strategy relies upon market reactions to foreign
events during the Euro crisis. The transmission of these events provides variation in yields that have a degree
of separation from local economic conditions; I show that the market reaction to these events does not seem
to be explained by other local economic or monetary shocks.
I show that changes in sovereign yields driven by foreign events were a critical driver of macroeconomic
dynamics in crisis-hit Euro Area countries over the crisis period. The identiﬁed systemic shocks explain 45%
of the forecast error variance in the unemployment rate and 35% of variance in a composite measure of the
private cost of ﬁnance. I also ﬁnd that systemic shocks explain a substantial proportion of the variation in
overall borrowing costs faced by crisis-hit countries, explaining 50% of the forecast error variance and 40-60%
of the trough to peak move in bond yields in crisis-hit countries.
How generalisable these results are needs to be assessed. An analysis such as this is exposed to the Lucas
critique. The results would be diﬀerent if policymakers behaved diﬀerently. A more important caveat is that
the Euro Area presents a rather speciﬁc circumstance. It is a monetary union where local sovereign's issue
49A placebo study based on a random set of time windows leads to much the same results.
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debt in a currency that they do not control. This has several implications. Euro Area sovereigns may be more
vulnerable to belief-driven crises than those with monetary sovereignty. The loss of access to the printing press
may also limit the inﬂationary consequences of a crisis due to controls over monetary ﬁnancing. However,
external central bank ﬁnance is still available via the ECB. Whether the results presented here would be
replicated if a similar analysis was conducted in countries such as the US, assuming an appropriate proxy
could be found, is diﬃcult to tell. A better comparator may be countries that have debt in an external
currency such as in many emerging markets. In that regard, an interesting extension of the work here is to
apply the methodology to the Asian crisis using the transmission of events that occurred in that period.
Another interesting angle for future research is whether these results can shed light more on the appro-
priateness of the micro-foundations of channels by which sovereign risk feeds through into the real economy.
This paper highlights several mechanisms and it would be interesting to see if a medium scale DSGE model
allowing for exogenous variation in sovereign default risk can replicate the impulse responses. One challenge
that needs to be overcome is recognising that the costs of high sovereign risk premia and default are not
necessarily equivalent. This paper documents the experience of four countries who kept debtors whole but
suﬀered substantial output losses nonetheless. Any new theoretical framework needs to take this fact into
consideration.
The methodology also presents a couple of avenues for exploration in future research. This paper is the
ﬁrst to adapt the proxy SVAR approach into a Bayesian setup. In this context, the Bayesian approach was
useful in that it allowed for panel assumptions. However, the sampler used here could be adapted to allow for
time-varying coeﬃcients or stochastic volatility. A second avenue for potential future research is the general
use of the proxy SVAR methodology combined with ﬁnancial market reactions to identify shocks of a ﬁnancial
nature. The identiﬁcation of shocks of this type is challenging as there are no valid short run restrictions
that can be imposed; market prices cannot be assumed to be contemporaneously independent. One could
also adapt the strategy to the high frequency identiﬁcation of monetary shocks, or to oil shocks using the
high frequency reaction of oil prices.
The dataset used in this paper has further applications. Although this paper is silent regarding the expla-
nation behind observed market reactions, the narrative dataset can also be used to explore the determinants
of the transmission of sovereign risk between countries at diﬀerent times. For example, one could investigate
if certain countries were of systemic importance at diﬀerent times, in addition to which sorts of events the
markets were sensitive to. Potentially, one could also use the events to test forms of market eﬃciency.
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A The conditional distribution of the proxy.
This appendix details the distribution of the proxy variable under random censoring and derives the linear
relationship with the reduce form errors. Recall the assumed data generating process:
mdt = ϑdt(ψεdt + vdt) (9)
Under random censoring, the density of mdt, given the true structural shock, εdt, can be expressed as:
P (md|ψ, εd, p) =
(
(2piσ2v)
− 12 exp
{
−1
2
(
md − ψεd
σv
)2}
p
)1−10(md)
(1− p)10(md) (10)
Where 10(md) is an indicator variable which returns 1 if md = 0 and zero otherwise and E(ϑdt|εdt) =
E(ϑdt) = p. Dropping the time t subscripts, this density implies the moment generating function is given by:
Mmd(g) =
∞ˆ
−∞
exp {gmd}
(
p(2piσ2v)
− 12 exp
{
−1
2
(
md − ψεd
σv
)2})1−10(md)
(1− p)10(md)dmd (11)
This integral can be rewritten as:
Mmd(g) =
∞ˆ
−∞
(
p(2piσ2v)
− 12 exp
{
−1
2
(
md − ψεd
σv
)2}
exp {gmd}+ δ(md)(1− p)exp {gmd}
)
dmd
Where δ(md) is the Dirac delta function. Solving the integral yields:
Mmd(g) = (1− p) + pexp
{
gψεd +
g2
2
σ2v
}
(12)
Using the independence of observations md; the moment generating function of m is simply the product of
the Mmd over d:
Mm(g) =
M∏
d=1
((1− p) + p.exp
{
gψεd +
g2
2
σ2v
}
) (13)
The moments of m follow E(mn) = ∂
nMm(0)
∂gn . For exposition it is useful to deﬁne exp
{
gψεd +
g2
2 σ
2
v
}
= xd,
noting that xd = 1 if g = 0. Using the product rule:
∂Mm(g)
∂g
=
M∑
d=1
(p(ψεd + gσ
2
v)xd
M∏
s6=d
((1− p) + pxs) (14)
which implies the ﬁrst moment is given by:
E(m|εd) = pψ
M∑
d=1
εd = pψa1u = E(m|u) (15)
To calculate the second moment, the second diﬀerential is:
∂2Mm(g)
∂g2
=
M∑
d=1
p(σ2v + (ψεd + gσ2v)2)xd M∏
s6=d
((1− p) + pxs) + p2(ψεd + gσ2v)xd
M∑
s 6=d
((ψεs + gσ2v)xs
M∏
r 6=s,d
((1− p) + pxr)


hence:
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E(m2|εd) = p
M∑
d=1
(σ2v + (ψ2ε2d)) + p2ψ2εd M∑
s6=d
{εs}

Since the individual daily observations are unobservable, what we care about is E(m2|u), which, by the
law of iterated expectations, is simply:
E(m2|u) = pMσ2v + p2ψ2
M∑
d=1
E(ε2d|u) + M∑
s 6=d
E(εsεd|u)

Noting that εd and u are jointly Gaussian with Cov(εd, u) =
a1Σu
M . Using the properties of the multivariate
normal, one can write E(εd|u) = a1uM , V ar(εd|u) = 1−a1ΣuΣ
−1
u Σua
′
1
M2 = (M−1)/M2 and Cov(εsεd|u) = −1/M2.
Thus E(ε2d|u) = a1uu
′a
′
1+(M−1)
M2 and E(εdεs|u) = a1uu
′a
′
1−1
M2 . From here it is obvious that V ar(m|u) = pMσ2v .
B Data and Sources
B.1 Constructing the proxy variable
The proxy is designed as an aggregation of the local bond market reactions to foreign events such as those
described in section 3. Therefore, in order to construct it three pieces of information are required: (i) a set
of important events related to the crisis that are country-speciﬁc; (ii) the time that each event occurred and
(iii) the high frequency bond reaction around each event occurring. I describe how each piece is obtained in
turn. The narrative analysis is conducted from July 2009 to March 2013.
The Euro crisis is well-documented and comprises a vast set of largely idiosyncratic events that make
tracking the evolution of the crisis from a narrative perspective methodologically challenging. The ﬂow of
information related to the crisis has to be processed in an objective fashion to prevent systematic errors that
may bias the results. A ﬁlter for the information ﬂow is, by deﬁnition, media outlets, which have been relied
upon for narrative studies of the crisis elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Beetsma et al. (2013) and Brutti
and Saure (2013)). As the Euro Area bond market reaction is the ultimate variable of interest, restricting
attention to ﬁnancial news sources is appropriate.
I use the ﬁnancial news sources Bloomberg and EuroIntelligence both of which compile a daily news
brieﬁng for European economic news, with the former released in the afternoon and the latter in the morning.
The Bloomberg news coverage for the Euro Area is available from any Bloomberg terminal by entering TOP
EUROPE; in the early evening a news item appears with the top stories for the day and a complete history
of previous brieﬁngs is available. The details on how EuroIntelligence operates can be found in Beetsma
et al. (2013) who rely on the source to construct their news based series. As the objective of this narrative
is to assess the impact of foreign, country-speciﬁc events on local borrowing costs for use as an identiﬁcation
strategy, this reliance on pan-European news summaries serves as a ﬁlter, because the country speciﬁc event
must be of suﬃcient international interest to make the brieﬁng. As described, this is not to say the market
reacts strongly to every news story within the summaries.
While there is a large overlap in terms of events between these two sources, the timing of the news
summary turns out to be of importance. Twenty-four hours represents a long period of time in the context
of certain points in the crisis; stories that occur overnight can be overtaken by events the next day such that
they do not make the afternoon brieﬁng; similarly, events that occur early in the day are out of date once a
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brieﬁng is released the next morning. In combination these two brieﬁngs provide half-day snapshots of the
key news stories that can be assumed to be aﬀecting Euro Area bond markets.
There are alternative sources available: for example from the Reuters news agency. However, the two
sources used here are chosen due to the diﬀerence in release times. Experiments with alternative sources does
not improve coverage as additional sources have almost complete overlap with the two already considered.
Given the set of stories that appear within the summaries, the next step is to determine whether any of
them constitute an event that is of interest for the narrative. The news brieﬁngs are read manually, and to
be classiﬁed as an event and included in the narrative, a news story must satisfy the following criteria:
1. The story must relate to a single crisis-hit country; speciﬁcally, either Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland,
Italy or Spain. As discussed previously pan-Euro Area policy interventions are not included because the
identifying assumptions are harder to justify. Experiments with political events in non-crisis countries
revealed that bond markets do not react strongly to this form of news and as such these countries are
omitted for the sake of parsimony.50 Stories that relate to foreign policymakers intervening in a speciﬁc
crisis country are not omitted from the benchmark speciﬁcation although they are in a robustness
analysis.
2. The event must be timeable in the sense that it is possible to isolate when it occurs so as to determine the
market's reaction. The focus therefore is mainly (although not exclusively) on oﬃcial announcements
and on the record statements. It is important to emphasise that an event is considered to be something
that happened at a particular time rather than any news story that is country-speciﬁc. This criterion
is discussed in more detail below.
3. Certain sorts of news are not considered:
(a) Anonymously sourced rumours/news that may make headlines.
(b) Reports by private companies or about private companies. News about, or statements by, private
individuals are also not included unless that individual has an oﬃcial policy-making or political
capacity.
(c) Editorial statements.
(d) Data releases are not included, as while surprises in these indicators are strongly correlated across
countries they are often reﬂective of real shocks such as a common Euro Area business cycle. An
exception to this are oﬃcial revisions to past and future projections of annual ﬁscal numbers which
were of key importance during the early stages of the crisis in Greece. The relatively low frequency
of these numbers and the lag in their release prevents the market reaction to them being related
to cyclical news.
Events are timed to the minute when the ﬁrst headline related to the story appears on the Bloomberg newswire.
This need for an initial headline is less restrictive than one may think. While many news stories are ongoing
over several days or even weeks, most are a combination of discrete events that break at certain times. The
bulk of events considered in the dataset are essentially announcements, speeches or statements to the press
from an oﬃcial source; therefore, the timing is not subjective. As a caveat, for this approach to be workable,
news stories as they appear in the summary often have to be broken up into discrete announcements. For
example, stories often include comments from several individual policymakers. In such circumstances the
50A second reason for is that Germany and France are large economies tightly integrated with the rest of the currency union.
Events in these countries have implications above and beyond the bond market reaction. For example, German ﬁscal policy
clearly aﬀects the rest of the union via demand channels; while Greek or Portuguese ﬁscal policy is less relevant.
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time of each statement would be used as an event - or combined into a longer window if the statements are
close together.
However, there are exceptions where this chain of discrete announcements does not apply. An untimeable
story is one where it is impossible to identify an initial headline in an objective fashion. News stories for
which it is impossible to determine a time are often ongoing events and not breaking news, for example a
strike which lasts all day has no speciﬁc time at which one can assess the market's reaction.51 Alternatively,
it could be a story that mutates rapidly, with either conﬂicting reports or more and more details emerging
over a sustained period of time moving markets in a variety of ways. While it is possible to analyse such an
event ex-post it is impossible to judge the appropriate time to asses the market reaction in real time.52
For events that can be timed, the market reaction is considered over a 20 minute window on either side of
the initial headline. This window starts slightly earlier than suggested by Gürkaynak and Wright (2013) who
recommend, in their primer on high frequency identiﬁcation, that the window starts 5 minutes prior to the
announcement (and 15 minutes after). A slightly wider window is used here because the events considered
do not necessarily have a release ﬁxed time (in contrast to a data release); thus there is no guarantee
that the news wire has immediately picked up the announcement and a more conservative timing strategy
seems appropriate. Some events, such as speeches and budget announcements last more than 20 minutes in
which case the market reaction is considered to 20 minutes after the announcement ends (timed as the last
relevant headline on the Bloomberg newswire). If a public event last more than 90 minutes it would not be
considered timeable; however, this does not happen in the present version of the dataset. With closed door
events/meetings, such as conferences and summits, the relevant time is taken as the start of the post-event
press conferences which normally corresponds to the release of the press communique.
The market reaction is deﬁned as the change in the mid-yield to maturity on the benchmark 10 year
sovereign bond. Note that this is not the country where the event occurred; thus if the local country of
interest is Italy and the event is in Greece, then the reaction would be the change in the Italian bond yield in
the interval around the Greek event. The raw intra-day bond data is sourced at tick frequency from ICAP,
a brokerage ﬁrm which gathers the data while intermediating wholesale trading between major commercial
and investment banks. The tick data is converted into one minute 90% trimmed averages so as to remove
any spikes at a very high frequency; the market reaction is calculated as changes in the averaged minute by
minute series. Only ticks between 07:30 and 16:30 London time are used, i.e. the time at which the London
market is open. Ticks outside this interval are too infrequent to be relied upon. The market reaction to
included events that occur outside of normal trading hours is calculated as the change from the previous
close to 08:30 London time on the morning of the ﬁrst trading day after the event. The period between
07:30am-08:30 is noisy and subject to spikes, thus for overnight reactions I record the market position at
08:30.
B.2 Properties of the proxies
Readers are referred to the online appendix, see links below, for an exhaustive list of narrative events.
However, some clarity over the type of events included in the narrative series can be achieved by placing the
events in loose classiﬁcations with accompanying examples:
1. Event country political news: This is the broadest category and includes policy announcements by
oﬃcials, changes in government, votes in parliament, elections and important polls. Relevant news
51On the other hand strikes are announced in advance and such announcements are considered a timeable event.
52As an example of this, consider the case of 20th October 2011 when a Greek protestor tragically died in violent demonstrations
on the 20th October 2011, Markets appeared to react as they have done to other episodes of violence in Greece but the news
broke only gradually and the cause was revealed to be as a result of a heart attack only after some time.
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Table 1: Breakdown of event classiﬁcation by country
Event Country: Greece Italy Portugal Spain Ireland Cyprus Total
Number of Events: 287 148 120 163 105 32 855
E
v
en
t
T
y
p
e
(%
)
Domestic Political 47.7 73.6 53.3 51.5 53.3 50.0 54.5
Foreign Interventions 25.1 1.4 13.3 11.7 20.0 31.3 16.4
Technical News 17.1 23.6 28.3 34.4 22.9 18.8 23.9
Domestic Instability 7.0 1.4 3.3 1.8 1.0 0.0 3.5
Fiscal Data 3.1 0.0 1.7 0.6 1.9 0.0 1.6
Notes: The table summarises the total number of timeable, country speciﬁc events over the period July 2009-March 2013 as isolated
using EuroIntelligence and Bloomberg European news summaries. Six crisis hit countries are considered and the total column represents
the sum over the 6 countries. Events that overlap with data releases or other events as well as events that happen outside the trading
hours are not excluded at this stage. Events are classiﬁed as in the main text. Percentages may not sum due to rounding.
regarding scandals involving government oﬃcials, for example the donations scandal involving the
Spanish Prime Minister in February 2013, are also included.
2. External interventions: These refer to statements by external policymakers, particularly Troika mem-
bers,53 about activities relating only to the speciﬁc event country. The various bailout agreements are
obvious examples, as well as the approval of critical disbursements. Other examples included are the
release of Troika reviews, decisions by the ECB regarding the acceptability of bonds as collateral and
statements following Eurogroup meetings on speciﬁc countries.
3. Technical events: These refer to technical market news directly related to the event country sovereign
bond market. This includes the results from important bond auctions (either from a liquidity perspective
or due to their signaling value), pronouncements by credit rating agencies and decisions from the ISDA
over whether certain policy actions (such as the bond buy-back programme) constitute technical default.
4. Event country ﬁscal data: These events relate to revisions in past ﬁscal numbers and future ﬁscal
projections. News stories regarding statements from European and local authorities about the quality
of data collection are also included. Note that events that relate to the standard monthly/quarterly
data releases are not included.
5. Event country instability: Due to diﬃculty in timing the events, strikes and protests are generally not
included as events unto themselves. However, what is included are the announcements concerning when
strikes and protests will take place. Also included are violent events that occur during a protest; for
example, and with reference to Greece, ministry buildings are stormed on several occasions. However,
events of violence are included only if it is possible to ﬁnd an objective time to assess the market's
reaction.
Table 1 provides details of the number of events identiﬁed in each crisis country. As one would expect given
the country's role as the initial focal point of the crisis, Greece has the most events by raw number, followed
by Spain and Italy, reﬂecting their large size. The thirty-two Cypriot events are largely concentrated in March
2013 (eighteen events occurred that month) indicative of the uncertainty surrounding this small country's
bailout. The breakdown of events into ﬁve classiﬁcations are similar across countries with the exception of
Italy, where foreign interventions are less prevalent. This is reasonable as Italy is the only country not to
receive a bailout in some form over the time period.
Table 2 oﬀers some descriptive statistics for the proxy variables in the four countries of interest. The
number of events that enter the proxy is substantially less than the total number of identiﬁed events across
53Only statements by international or pan-European policymakers are included.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the proxy variable
Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
Total Number of Included Events 452 391 479 393
Share outside trading hours (%) 23.7 13.0 21.1 30.8
Correl. with Actual Chg. in Bond Yield 0.76 0.65 0.38 0.55
Average Market Move (bp) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Average Absolute Market Move (bp) 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.6
Std. Dev. Market Move (bp) 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.1
Maximum Market Move (bp) 20.8 18.5 21.5 15.2
Minimum Market Move (bp) -17.1 -23.1 -35.6 -33.2
Percentage of absolute change due to:
Greece (%) 46.1 41.2 42.2 38.6
Italy (%) 0.0 24.3 17.9 20.1
Portugal (%) 11.6 12.7 0.0 14.7
Spain (%) 25.7 0.0 25.4 25.1
Ireland (%) 9.5 13.9 10.6 0.0
Cyprus (%) 7.0 7.9 4.0 1.5
Notes: Events included in the proxy variable satisfying the criteria in section 3.3. Data period is July 2009 - March 2013. Irish proxy
excludes May-October 2011 due to a break in intra-day data. Overlapping events, non-headline events outside the market open and
domestic events are not included. The correlation is between the actual change in the bond yield in the month and the sum of market
moves about events in that month. Market moves refer to change in local 10 year bond yields in a 20 minute window about an event.
The percentage shares refer to the share total the absolute market move around events that can be attributed to events in a particular
country. Percentages may not sum due to rounding.
the six countries. This is because domestic events, events that overlap with other news and events outside
the trading hours which are not headline news are excluded at this stage. The intra-day market reactions
to events display similar statistical properties across countries which is somewhat surprising given that, on a
daily basis, Portuguese and Irish yields are more volatile. Greece is the largest contributor to the variation
in the proxy; approximately 40% of the total absolute market movement around events is due to Greek news.
This share is roughly in line with the relative number of events that are of Greek origin - it is not the case
that markets are reacting more strongly to Greek news on average , merely that there are more Greek events
to react to.
B.3 Weblinks to the narrative series
Due to the size of the narrative dataset it is more straightforward to communicate the included events and the
size of the market reaction to them in a spreadsheet format rather than via a document. Therefore, I provide
the following links to online datasets that describe the narrative series of events and the market reaction to
them. Unfortunately, due to licensing constraints the underlying tick data cannot be made available.
1. This spreadsheet of events provides the following information:
(a) of all the identiﬁed events in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
(b) the source news summary corresponding to each event.
(c) the time that event occurred, identiﬁed as the ﬁrst headline relevant to the event on the Bloomberg
news wire. If applicable, an end time is included related to the last headline relevant to the release.
This is relevant to events that are extended announcements over several minutes such as speeches.
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(d) The classiﬁcation of the events into the categories as laid out in the main text.
(e) Whether or not the event was the top story (headline) in the morning news brieﬁng.
(f) For the case of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain the high frequency bond market reaction in the
relevant window around the event. It is worth noting that these are raw market reactions. No
attempt has been made here to check for overlapping events that may provoke large unexplained
reactions.
2. The calculations of the proxies themselves can be found in the following spreadsheets. These sheets
detail the high frequency bond market reaction to every included event and calculate whether there is
an overlap with another event. The various proxies used (including those for robustness checks) are all
included.
(a) The Irish proxy
(b) The Italian proxy
(c) The Portuguese proxy
(d) The Spanish proxy
B.4 VAR data sources:
10 year sovereign bonds: The intraday data only extends back to July-2009. For the complete VAR
sample, from 2007 to 2013 , the monthly average of the daily yield on the 10 year benchmark sovereign bond
on Bloomberg is used instead. The correlation between this series and the intraday yield at close is greater
than 0.95 for all four countries on a daily basis from July 2009 to March 2013. The relevant Bloomberg codes
are: Italy: GTITL10Y; Spain: GTESP10Y; Ireland: GTIEP10Y; Portugal: GTPTE10Y.
Industrial Production: The industrial production index is sourced from Eurostat. The broadest index
possible is used, including the manufacturing, energy and construction sectors (Eurostat code: sts_inpr_m).
The underlying data is presented as an index with 2005 as a base year.
Consumer Prices: The harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) is sourced from Eurostat. The
headline index is used - all items including the food and energy (Eurostat code: prc_hicp_midx ). The
underlying data is presented as an index with 2005 as a base year.
Unemployment: The harmonised unemployment rates are sourced from Eurostat and expressed as a percent
of the labour force (Eurostat code: une_rt_m).
3 month Eurepo Rate: The 3 month Eurepo rate is measured as the monthly average of the daily Eurepo
ﬁxing by the European Banking Federation (http://www.euribor-ebf.eu/eurepo-org/about-eurepo.html).
10 year overnight index swap (OIS) rate: The 10 year OIS rate is measured as the monthly average of
the daily series compiled by Bloomberg from over-the-counter brokers in the OIS market (Bloomberg code:
EUSA10 CMPN)
Private Sector Cost of Finance: This is computed internally by the Capital Markets/Financial Structure
division of the ECB for each country in the Euro Area. It is the amalgamation of the cost of loans to the
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non-ﬁnancial private sector, the cost of corporate bonds and the cost of equity (the latter two apply to non-
ﬁnancial corporations only). The cost of the three sources of ﬁnance are weighted using ﬂows of new liability
acquisition by non-ﬁnancial private sector. This creates an average cost of ﬁnance faced by the private sector
analogous to an overall interest rate on ﬁnancial liabilities. The cost can be decomposed into its constituent
components as is shown in the robustness analysis. The cost equity is not available consistently throughout
the sample so equity prices are used instead.
Equity Prices: The main equity price index for each country is sourced from Eurostat as a monthly average.
The indices are rebased such that 2005=100 (Eurostat code: mny_stk_spy_m). The country indices are
better known as: Italian FTSE MIB Index, Portuguese Stock Index 20, Irish Stock Exchange Equity Overall
Index, Spanish Association of Stock Exchanges Index.
Primary Fiscal Balances: This is the most complex input into the VAR. As no oﬃcial monthly data for
ﬁscal balances exists on an accruals basis, one is constructed using interpolation methods. Since ﬁscal numbers
are available on a cash accounting basis at monthly frequency, these series serve as natural interpolands. The
quarterly primary ﬁscal balance is deﬁned as the net lending/borrowing of the general government sector plus
interest payments. This is sourced from the Eurostat ﬂow of funds database; the ﬁscal balance is created using
the non-ﬁnancial accounts (Eurostat code: nasq_nf_tr). Flow of funds data are in millions of nominal euros
and are not seasonally adjusted. The unadjusted balance as a percentage of GDP is calculated by dividing
through by quarterly, nominal GDP from Eurostat in millions of Euros (Eurostat code: namq_gdp_c). The
adjusted quarterly balance is created by placing this data through an X.12 ﬁlter. Monthly nominal GDP is
constructed by placing a cubic spline through the quarterly series in each country; since monthly GDP is
the relatively stable denominator in the monthly ﬁscal series this choice of interpolation technique is of little
importance. The interpolation procedure for the ﬁscal balance is conducted in percentage of GDP terms
using the regression based procedure in Mitchell et al. (2005). The interpolation is regression estimated
using maximum likelihood; it is assumed the underlying ﬁscal balance is an ARX(1,1) on a monthly basis
restricted such that the sum of the monthly balances equal the quarterly ﬁgure. Experiments with alternative
lag structures revealed little sensitivity to alternative speciﬁcations. The diﬀerences across countries in the
availability of monthly ﬁscal data across countries mean that the interpolands and sample periods are country
speciﬁc:
• Italy: The ﬁrst interpoland is monthly the central government balance less central government interest
payments (both millions of Euros, calculated on a cash accounting basis and non-seasonally adjusted).
The second interpoland is the change in general government debt (millions of Euros, non-seasonally
adjusted). Both interpolands are divided through by monthly nominal GDP and seasonally adjusted
using an X.12 procedure. Both series are sourced from the Italian Finance Ministry. The sample period
for the estimation is January 2000 to March 2013. The model is extended beyond the sample for the
VAR to improve the quality of the ﬁt.
• Spain: The ﬁrst interpoland is monthly the central primary government balance (in millions of Euros,
calculated on a accruals basis and non-seasonally adjusted). The second interpoland is the monthly
change in central government gross debt outstanding (millions of Euros, non-seasonally adjusted).
Both interpolands are divided through by monthly nominal GDP and seasonally adjusted using an
X.12 procedure. Both series are sourced from the Spanish Finance Ministry. The sample period for the
estimation is January 1999 to March 2013.
• Portugal: The ﬁrst interpoland is monthly the central government balance (in millions of Euros,
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calculated on a cash accounting basis and non-seasonally adjusted). The second interpoland is the
change in general government debt (millions of Euros, non-seasonally adjusted). Both interpolands are
divided through by monthly nominal GDP and seasonally adjusted using an X.12 procedure. Both
series are sourced from the Portuguese Finance Ministry. The sample period for the estimation is
January 2000 to March 2013.
• Ireland: There is a single interpoland which is monthly the Exchequer surplus, equivalent to the central
government balance, (in millions of Euros, calculated on a cash accounting basis and non-seasonally
adjusted). The interpolands are divided through by monthly nominal GDP and seasonally adjusted
using an X.12 procedure. The series is sourced from the Irish Finance Ministry. The sample period for
the estimation is January 2000 to March 2013.
The interpolation procedure appears to work well, there are no unusually large spikes in the monthly series and
they interpolated ﬁgures do not resemble the output from a deterministic interpolation procedure, suggesting
the monthly interpolands are informative.
Trade Balance: The goods trade balance in millions of euros is sourced from Eurostat (code: ext_st_27msbec).
Included traded sectors are those contained in the BEC industry classiﬁcation. The data is seasonally and
working day adjusted and corresponds to the balance with the rest of the world (both Euro Area and non-
Euro Area trading partners). The trade balance is placed into percentage of GDP terms by dividing through
by nominal GDP interpolated with a cubic spline (see primary ﬁscal balances).
Target 2 Balance: Data for target 2 balances are sourced from the updated dataset of Steinkamp and
Westermann (2012) (available online at http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/). The data is in millions of euros.
The balance is converted into percentage of GDP terms by dividing through by nominal GDP interpolated
with a cubic spline (see primary ﬁscal balances).
C MCMC Sampler
Deﬁne the parameter space in the model as:
Θ = {β1, . . . , βC ,Σ1,u, . . . ,ΣC,u, γ1, . . . , γC , β¯, λβ , S¯,Υ1, . . . ,ΥC , σ1ω, . . . , σCω, Υ¯, λΥ}.
To simplify the notation deﬁne the set of data used in the reduced form VAR as Y = {Y1, . . . , YC , X1, . . . , XC , Z1, . . . , ZC}
and the proxy variables asM = {M1, . . . ,MC}. Deﬁne the data matrix of reduced form VAR residuals, Uc,
as: Uc = Yc−XcBc−ZcΓc. By Bayes rule the likelihood of the data is equal to the product of the likelihood
of the proxy variables conditional on both the reduced form model and the data and the likelihood of the
reduced form model given the data: p(M, Y |Θ) = p(M|Y,Θ)p(Y |Θ) = ∏c p(Mc|Yc,Θ)p(Yc|Θ).
In terms of the former, as is standard with linear models with Student-t errors, by expanding the parameter
space it is possible to rewrite the conditional density as a Gaussian regression model with heteroskedastic
errors:
Mc|Yc ∼ N(UcΥc, σ2ωcΞc)
Where the matrix Ξc is a diagonal vector of unknown parameters equal to diag{ξc1, . . . , ξcT ). With the
additional prior assumption ν/ξci ∼ χ2(ν) ∀i = 1, . . . , T , where ν are the degrees of freedom on the student-t
errors, Geweke (1993) shows this is equivalent to a linear model with t-errors as described in the main text.
46
The intuition follows from the deﬁnition of the t-distribution as a ratio between a normal and a χ2. Deﬁne
the residuals from the proxy model as: Vc = (Mc − UcΥc). This gives:
p(Mc|Yc,Θ) = σ−T−1cω
∏
t
ξ
−1/2
ct exp
[
−
T∑
t=1
(mc,t −Υcuc,t)2
2ξctσ2cω
]
= σ−T−1cω |Ξc|−
1
2 exp
{
−1
2
{
σ−2cω V
′
cΞ
−1
c Vc
}}
The likelihood of the reduced form VAR model, p(Y |Θ), is the product of the country speciﬁc Gaussian
distributions as deﬁned in equation 3. Combining these two densities with the priors gives a joint posterior
density, p(M, Y |Θ)p(Θ), proportional to:
|S¯|
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2 (λΥλβ)
− v+2+C
2
∏
c
(
σ
−T−1
cω |Ξc|
− 1
2 |Σc,u|−
T+κ+N+1
2
)
exp
 sλβ +
s
λΥ
 . . . . . .
exp
{
−
1
2
(∑
c
{
tr
[
(U
′
cUcΣ
−1
c,u) + S¯Σ
−1
c,u
]
+ (βc − β¯)′(λβLc,β)−1(βc − β¯) + (Υc − Υ¯)′(λΥLc,Υ)−1(Υc − Υ¯) + σ−2cω V
′
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−1
c )
})}
This is a convienent way to express the posterior. However, it is also apparent that the VAR data and the
proxy are jointly Guassian:(
yc
Mc
)
|Θ ∼ N
(
(IN ⊗Xc)βc + (IN ⊗ Zc)γc
0
,
[
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]
For all the parameters in the model the conditional densities used in the Gibbs Sampler are in the form of
classical distributions. The conditional density of the slope coeﬃceints is:
p(βc|Y,M,Θ \ βc) = exp
{
−1
2
({
tr
[
(U
′
cUcΣ
−1
c,u)
]
+ (βc − β¯)′(λβLc,β)−1(βc − β¯) + σ−2cω V ′cΞ−1c Vc
})}
Using the joint Gaussian density of the proxy and the reduced form one can show:
p(βc|Y,M,Θ \ βc) ∝ N(D−1c dc, D−1c ) (16)
where
Dc = (IN ⊗Xc)′(Φc,11 − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Φc,22)−1(IN ⊗Xc) + λ−1β L−1c,β
dc = (IN ⊗Xc)′(Φc,11 − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Φc,21)−1(yc − (IN ⊗ Zc)γc − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Mc) + λ−1β L−1c,β β¯
The coeﬃcients on the deterministic terms in the reduced form VAR have a similar form, the conditional
density is given by:
p(γc|Y,M,Θ \ γc) = exp
{
−1
2
({
tr
[
(U
′
cUcΣ
−1
c,u)
]
+ σ−2cω V
′
cΞ
−1
c Vc
})}
This is also Gaussian:
p(γc|Y,M,Θ \ γc) ∝ N(F−1c fc, F−1c )
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where
Fc = (IN ⊗ Zc)′(Φc,11 − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Φc,21)−1(IN ⊗ Zc)
fc = (IN ⊗ Zc)′(Φc,11 − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Φc,21)−1(yc − (IN ⊗Xc)βc − Φc,12Φ−1c,22Mc)
The conditional posterior of Σc is proportional to:
p(Σc,u|Y,Θ \ Σc,u) ∝ |Σc,u|−
T+κ+N+1
2 exp{−1
2
tr
[
(U
′
cUc) + S¯
]
Σ−1c,u}
which is consistent with an inverse-Wishart distribution:
p(Σc|Y,Θ1 \ Σc,u) ∝ iW ((U ′cUc) + S¯, T + κ)
In terms of the cross-country hyper-parameters, β¯, has a conditional posterior proportional to a Normal:
p(β¯|Y,Θ \ β¯) ∝ N(
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c
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]
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]−1
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Gc = (λβLc,β)
−1
gc = (λβLc,β)
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The conditional posterior of S¯ is proportional to:
p(S¯|Y,Θ \ S¯) ∝ |S¯|Cκ−N−12 exp{−1
2
trS¯
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}
which corresponds to a Wishart distribution:
p(S¯|Y,Θ \ S¯) ∝W
[∑
c
Σ−1c,u
]−1
, Cκ

Note that E(S¯|Y,Θ\ S¯) = Cκ(∑c [Σ−1c,u])−1. This implies that the expected value of S¯ is the harmonic mean
of the individual country covariance matrices scaled by the degrees of freedom parameter κ. This is used to
determine the covariance of the cross-country model, Σ¯, for use in impulses etc. By setting Σ¯ = S¯/κ, one
obtains a matrix that is analogous to a covariance matrix and in (conditional) expectation is equivalent to
the harmonic mean of the estimated country covariances.
The conditional posterior for the shrinkage parameter, λ1, is proportional to:
p(λβ |Y,Θ \ λβ) ∝ λ−
CN2L+v+2
2
β exp
{
−1
2
(
s
λβ
+
∑
c
[
(βc − β¯)′λ−1β L−1c,β(βc − β¯)
])}
or
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p(λβ |Y,Θ \ λβ) = iG2
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]
, CN2L+ v
)
Where iG2 refers to an inverted Gamma-2 distribution. For computational convenience, it is easier to draw
from the posterior distribution of the inverse of λβ which is easily shown to be proportional to a standard
Gamma distribution.
In terms of the identiﬁcation parameters, the slope terms have the following conditional densities:
p(Υc|Y,Θ \Υc) ∝ N(K−1c kc,K−1c )
where:
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And the conditional posterior of σ2ωc is proportional to:
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which is consistent with an inverse-Gamma distribution:
p(σ2ωc|Y,Θ \ σ2ωc) ∝ iG((V
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The conditional posterior of ξct, the diagonals in Ξc, can be expressed as:
p(ξct|Y,Θ) ∝ ξ−(ν+3)/2ct exp
[
−(σ−2ωc (mct −Υ
′
uct) + ν)/2ξct
]
Which is consistent with each diagonal element, ξct, being related to the inverse of a χ
2, speciﬁcally:
p((σ−2ωc (mct −Υ
′
uct) + ν)/ξct|Y,Θ) ∝ χ2(ν + 1)
In terms of the cross-country hyper-parameters, Υ¯ has a conditional posterior proportional to a Normal:
p(Υ¯|Y,Θ1 \ Υ¯) ∝ N(
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]−1 [∑
c
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]
,
[∑
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]−1
)
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Last, the posterior of λΥ is proportional to:
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p(λΥ|Y,Θ \ λΥ) = iG2
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Where iG2 refers to an inverted Gamma-2 distribution.
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Figure 3: Proxy variable and actual changes in the bond yield, other countries.
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Notes: Comparison between the actual behaviour of Spanish, Portuguese and Irish bond yields and the relevant proxy variable. Y-axis
denotes percentage moves in the month. Green line is the proxy variable calculated as the summed value of changes during events in
that month, right hand axis, blue line is the the actual change in the average daily 10-year bond yield, left hand axis. Irish proxy uses
daily changes on days of headline events from May-October 2011 due to a break in intra-day data.51
Figure 4: Events ranked by their squared market reaction
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Notes: The chart illustrates the relative importance of events contained in each country's proxy in terms of market reactions. X-axis
denotes the cumulative share of events in proxy ordered by size of market reaction. Y-axis denotes cumulative share total sum of
squared market reactions. Sample is events from period July 2009-March 2013. Irish proxy excludes events from May-October 2011 due
to a break in intra-day data. Overlapping events, non-headline events outside the market open and domestic events are not included.
Market moves refer to change in local 10 year bond yields in a 20 minute window about an event.
Figure 5: Simulated ω compared with classical distributions
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Notes: Censored distribution the kernel density of 1 million draws from the random censoring model with p = 0.15, M = 30 and
ψ = σ2v = 1. The normal distribution is selected to match the ﬁrst two moments, the scaled t the ﬁrst four moments.
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Figure 6: Mean Country Impulse Responses to a Systemic Shock (Benchmark Speciﬁcation)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a systemic shock scaled to be consistent with a 100bp increase in sovereign yield on impact and computed
over 24 months.Y-axis is percentage points in all cases. Mean country model refers to impulse responses estimated using β¯, Υ¯ and Σ¯.
Centre line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Error bands are 95% Bayesian credible intervals.
10 year refers to the 10 year sovereign bond, output refers to industrial production, Cost of ﬁn. to the private cost of ﬁnance. For exact
data deﬁnitions see main text and the data appendix.
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Figure 7: Country Speciﬁc Impulse Responses to a Systemic Shock
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Notes: IRFs are scaled to be consistent with a 100bp increase in sovereign yield on impact and are computed over 24 months.Y-axis is
percentage points in all cases. Centre line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Error bands are
95% Bayesian credible intervals. Due to similarity with mean country models responses of the Eurepo and OIS rates are not presented
for compactness. 10 year refers to the 10 year sovereign bond, output refers to industrial production, Cost of ﬁn. to the private cost of
ﬁnance. For exact data deﬁnitions see main text and the data appendix.
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Figure 8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Contribution of Systemic Shock)
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Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions to systemic shock. Computed over a 24 month horizon (x-axis). Line is the median of
10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Mean country model (in blue) refers to decomposition estimated using β¯, Υ¯
and Σ¯. 10 year refers to the 10 year sovereign bond, output refers to industrial production, Cost of ﬁn. to the private cost of ﬁnance.
For exact data deﬁnitions see main text and the data appendix.
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Figure 9: Mean Country Impulse Responses (augmented with additional private ﬁnancing sources)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a systemic shock scaled to be consistent with a 100bp increase in sovereign yield on impact and computed
over 24 months. VAR is augmented to include four additional ﬁnancial variables: A composite corporate bond yield (corp yield), the
cost loans faced by private sector, equity prices and bank credit supply. Y-axis is percentage points in all cases. Mean country model
refers to impulse responses estimated using β¯, Υ¯ and Σ¯. Centre line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated
posterior. Error bands are 95% Bayesian credible intervals. 10 year refers to the 10 year sovereign bond, output refers to industrial
production. For exact data deﬁnitions see main text and the data appendix.
Figure 10: Mean Country Impulse Responses (augmented with additional external series)
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Notes: Impulse responses to a systemic shock scaled to be consistent with a 100bp increase in sovereign yield on impact and computed
over 24 months. VAR is augmented to include three additional external variables: the change in the target 2 balance, the trade balance
and imports. Y-axis is percentage points in all cases. Mean country model refers to impulse responses estimated using β¯, Υ¯ and Σ¯.
Centre line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Error bands are 95% Bayesian credible intervals.
10 year refers to the 10 year sovereign bond, output refers to industrial production, Cost of ﬁn. to the private cost of ﬁnance. For exact
data deﬁnitions see main text and the data appendix.
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Figure 11: Counterfactual Analysis: Bond Yields
Actual versus counterfactual sovereign bond yields
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Notes: Counterfactuals are constructed by zeroing the systemic shocks and recreating the yield. Y-axis is percentage points. Cen-
tre line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Implied premia (lower pane) is equivalent to
Actual−Counterfactuals. Error bands are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 12: Counterfactual Analysis: Unemployment
Actual versus counterfactual unemployment rates
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Notes: Counterfactuals are constructed by zeroing the systemic shocks and recreating the yield. Y-axis is percentage points. Centre
line is the median of 10000 non-sequential draws from the simulated posterior. Unemployment gap (lower pane) is equivalent to
Actual−Counterfactuals. Error bands are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure 13: Mean country impulse response under alternative proxy deﬁnitions
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Notes: Comparison of results with alternative proxy deﬁnitions. Blue line and shaded areas are the benchmark case; the red lines
represent diﬀerent proxy deﬁnitions. Top pane has alternative proxies constructed using hourly event windows, using daily yield changes
on days of major events and using events only related to Greece. Lower pain has alternative proxies omitting certain types of events
including: events overnight, events involving foreign policymakers and events in the last 3 weeks of the month. Y-axis is in percentage
points, X-axis is months. Impulse responses scaled to be consistent with a 100bps increase in the bond yield.
Figure 14: Placebo Study
Notes: Results from the Placebo study compared with the benchmark. Placebo proxy constructed using same events timed to the
previous trading day. Red line with dash error bands refers to placebo study with 95% credible intervals. Blue line and shaded areas
refer to the benchmark case. Y-axis is in percentage points, X-axis is months. Impulse responses scaled to be consistent with a 100bps
increase in the bond yield and computed over 24 months.
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